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Between Iraq and a Hard Place: The
U.N. Compensation Commission and
Its Treatment of Gulf War Claims
ABSTRACT
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC)
was formed in 1991 to address claims against Iraq arising
out of the Gulf War. In its seven years of operation, the
UNCC has received 2.6 million claims, with an asserted value
of more than $244 billion. It has processed 2.4 million of
these claims, for a total of $6 billion, and it has paid to
victims more than $730 million.
Despite these
accomplishments, the UNCC has much left to do, and its
efforts have been burdened by Iraq'spost-warrefusal to meet
its treaty obligations. The UNCC now faces waning political
supportfrom U.N. members, who themselves face increasing
pressure from the international business community to
reintegrateIraq into the world economy.
This Note discusses the response of the United Nations to
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, including the formation of the
UNCC. It describes the structure and composition of the
UNCC and the procedures it has developed for addressing
claims. This Note also evaluates the UNCC's progress since
1991, with particularattentionto the political and commercial
forces that now threaten its mission. Finally, this Note
concludes that, despite international political sentiments
ranging from apathy to hostility, the United Nations must
reaffirm its commitment to international accountability
generally, and to the victims of the Gulf War in particular,by
continuing to support the UNCC.
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BETWEEN IRAQ AND A HARD PLACE
A mind that is diseased and feverish, being at the same time
corrupt and an agent of corruption, must be held in check by
remedies as severe as the vices from which it suffers.
Tacitus, Annals, III, liv1

I. INTRODUCTION

Though the techniques of warfare have changed through the
ages, the results of war have not: every campaign leaves victims
in its wake. Although in practice many of these victims are never
compensated, it is well settled that proponents of unjust wars owe
their victims restitution. 2 When these proponents lose, they can
be made to pay.
For two hundred years, international claims tribunals have
enforced such obligations. 3 The philosophical authority for their
existence lies in the work of Hugo Grotius. 4 In De Jure ac Pacis,

1.
HUGO GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI Ac PAcis LIBRI TRES, Vol. II, at 470
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1925) (1625) [hereinafter GROTIUS,
Kelsey trans.] (quoting Tacitus).
2.

See, e.g., HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 368-69

(William Whewell trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1853) (1625) [hereinafter
GROTIUS, Whewell trans.] (citing Cicero). See generally COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME (1911) (discussing in
two volumes such topics as treaties, international arbitration, and the laws of
war) (citing Grotius).
Grotius notes that restitution is a familiar concept in the Judeo-Christian and
Islamic traditions. GROTIUS, Whewell trans., supra, at 369. The earliest writings
on this subject express this proposition. See, e.g., GROTIUS, Kelsey trans., supra
note 1, at 469-70 (quoting Apuleius: "It is a more serious and unpleasant matter
than any punishment if impunity is extended to the guilty and he is not in the
meantime harassed by the censure of his fellow men.") (quoting Plutarch: "The
punishments which immediately follow the crime not only restrain boldness in
sinning for the future but also give the greatest comfort to those affected by the
wrong.") (citing Aristotle).
For a discussion of the history of international claims settlements, see
3.
E. K. NANTWI, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ARBITRAL
AWARDS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-19 (1966); MANLEY 0. HUDSON,
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, PAST AND FUTURE 3-14 (1944); JACKSON H. RALSTON, A

Brief History of International Arbitration, in THE LAW AND PROCEDURES OF
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, xxv-Xl (rev. ed. 1926).
4.
Grotius's eminence as a legal scholar is well-established:
Hugo Grotius, justly regarded as the founder of modem international law,
was the most remarkable man of the age in which he lived-an age
distinguished for men of genius and learning .... His great work, De Jure
This work has been
Belli ac Pacis,' was published at Paris in 1625 ....
translated into all languages, and has elicited the admiration of all nations
and of all succeeding ages. Its author is universally regarded as the great
master-builder of the science of international jurisprudence.
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Grotius writes that "restitution is due, from the authors of the
war, for all evils inflicted: and for anything unusual which they
have done, or not prevented when they could."s
Restitution may be exacted for any of three purposes:
correction, example, or retribution. 6 "Correction" is punishment
applied "for the good of the wrong-doer;" 7 it has as its object
"making better the man who has sinned."s
"Example" is
punishment applied to deter others from similar conduct, or "so
that the punishment of one may cause many to fear;" 9 it is
inflicted for the good of the whole, "to prevent others from being
induced by a feeling of security to annoy any persons
whatsoever."' 0 "Retribution" is punishment intended to satisfy
the person wronged." Although many U.N. member states would
likely approve all three purposes as justification for requiring Iraq
to compensate Gulf War victims, the U.N.'s primary goal in the
wake of the Gulf War was to provide a type of retributive
punishment-that is, to compensate victims for their losses. It

was this motivation which led the United Nations to establish the
United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC).12

HENRY WAGER HALLECK, 1 HALLECK'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 12 (Sherston Baker ed.,
Kegan, Paul, Trench, Turner, & Co., 3d ed. 1893) (1861). His works are still cited
for the precepts they establish. See, e.g., FREDERICK 0. BONKOVSKY, INTERNATIONAL
NORMS AND NATIONAL POLICY 65-80 (1980) (discussing Grotius's contributions to
the just-war theory); MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, 2 DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 829
(1937) (citing De Jure Beli ac Pacis for the proposition that "fault creates the
obligation to make good the loss"). For biographical information and analyses of
Grotius's major works, including De Jure Praedae, De Jure Belli ac Pads, and
Apologeticus, see EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE LIFE AND LEGAL WRITINGS OF HUGO
GROTIUS (1969).
5.
GROTIUS, Whewell trans., supranote 2, at 369.
6.
GROTIUS, Kelsey trans., supranote 1, at 469.
7.
Id. at 470.
8.
Id. Grotius cites, among others, Paul the jurist, Plato, Plutarch, and
Xenophon as approving this motivation for punishment. Id. at 470-71.
He
quotes Seneca as additional support for this notion: "'Just as we heat some
twisted spear-points to straighten them, and layD them on the anvil hammer....
not to break them, but to perfect them, so we correct serious depravities by bodily
and mental pain;'... '[such punishments are to be] received like a surgeon's
knife, abstinence, and other things that cause pain for our good.' " Id. at 470,
n. 1.
9.
Id. at 475. Grotius notes that the Greeks called this napasiyjiarn, the
Romans exempla. Id. He cites Pliny and Demosthenes as approving this theory of
punishment. Id. at 475-76.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 469. Grotius cites Taurus, Clement of Alexandria, Aristotle, and
Plutarch as sources for this theory. Id.
12.
Some scholars characterize the UNCC as within an established
tradition of international post-war tribunals.
See, e.g., David J. Bederman,
Historical Analogues of the United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE
UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 257 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995)
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Formed in 1991 to address claims against Iraq arising out of
the Gulf War, the UNCC has received 2.6 million claims, with an
asserted value of over $244 billion.1 3 It has processed 2.4 million
of these claims. 14 Despite this impressive accomplishment, the
UNCC has much left to do, and its efforts have been burdened by
Iraq's post-war refusal to meet its treaty obligations. The UNCC
now faces waning political support from U.N. members, who
themselves face increasing pressure from the international
business community to reintegrate Iraq into the world economy.
These problems raise significant questions: Considering that
the UNCC is expensive, time-consuming, and divisive, is it worth
the cost if it cannot substantially compensate victims? If partial
compensation is the ultimate result, what fraction of damages will
suffice to satisfy victims' needs and the world's sense of justice?
If the UNCC is to continue, what should it expect from the

[hereinafter Bederman, 1995]; David J. Bederman, The United Nations
Compensation Commission and the Traditionof International Claims Settlement, 27
N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Bederman, 1994]; David J.
Bederman, The Glorious Past and Uncertain Future of International Claims
Tribunals, in INTERNATIONAL COURTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 161, 189-93

(Mark W. Janis ed., 1992); Elyse J. Garmise, Note, The Iraqi Claims Process and
the Ghost of Versailles, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 840 (1992) (comparing the Iraqi claims
process to the Versailles claims process).
Others argue the Commission is a significant departure. See, e.g., Francis E.
McGovern, The Intellectual Heritage of Claims Processing at the United Nations
Compensation Commission, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION 45,
46-55 (Richard B. Lillich, ed. 1995) ("The structure and role of the UNCC does not
have a well-defined historical antecedent"); Bachir Georges Affaki, The United
Nations Compensation Commission: A New Era in Claims Settlement?, 10 J. INT'L
ARB. 21 (1993); Carlos Alzamora, Reflections on the United Nations Compensation
Commission, 9 ARB. INTL 349 (1993); John R. Crook, The United Nations
CompensationCommission-A New Structure to Enforce State Responsibility, 87 AM.
J. INT'L LAW 144 (1993); David H. Caron, The Gulf War, the U.N. Compensation
Commission and the Search for PracticalJustice,TRANSCRIPT 26 (Fall 199 1); Stanley
J. Glod, International Claims Arising from Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait, 25 INT'L LAW.
713 (1991).
13.
"A" Claims total $3.2 billion. Future of U.N.C.C. Hinges on Funding,
Says its Chief of Legal Services, 11 No. 10 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 19 (1996)
[hereinafter Future of U.N.C.C.]. See infra note 194. "B" claims total $13.45
million. Gustavo Capdevfla, Gulf War: Compensationfor Iraq Invasion Raised to
$6 Billion, Inter Press Serv., June 24, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7076118. See
infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text. "C" claims total $2.1 billion.
Capdevila, supra. See infra note 195. 1D" claims total approximately $15 billion.
Keith Highet et al., Intematiolnal Courts and Tribunals, 31 INT'L LAW. 599, 603
(1997). "E"claims total at least $82 billion. Neil King, Jr., Battle Plan: Firms Seek

Billions of Dollars to Cover Gulf WarLosses, WALL ST. J. (Eur.), Aug. 19, 1997, at 1,
available in 1997 WL-WSJE 12210226. "F" claims total at least $142 billion. Id.
Some estimates place the "F" claims as high as $200 billion. Highet et al., supra.
14.
U.N. to Compensate Egyptian Workers 84 Million Dollars, Xinhua Eng.
Newswire, Oct. 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11202588 [hereinafter U.N. to
Compensate Egyptian Workers].
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political and commercial entities that are increasingly
sympathetic to Iraq? This Note addresses these issues.
Part II of this Note discusses the response of the United
Nations to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, including the formation of
the UNCC. Part III describes the structure and composition of the
UNCC and the procedures it developed to address claims. Part IV
evaluates the UNCC's progress since 1991, with particular
attention to the political and commercial forces that now threaten
This Note concludes that, despite
the UNCC's mission.
international political sentiments ranging from apathy to hostility,
the United Nations must reaffi-m its commitment to international
accountability generally, and to the victims of the Gulf War in
particular, by continuing to support the UNCC.

II. THE U.N. RESPONSE TO IRAQ'S INVASION OF KUWAIT
The United Nations responded in two phases to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait. In its pre-Gulf War phase, the United Nations
issued a series of increasingly condemnatory resolutions against
Iraq, ultimately authorizing military action and warning Iraq of its
liability for invasion-related damages. In the post-Gulf War phase
of its response, the United Nations defmed the terms of Iraq's
surrender and outlined the compensation procedures to be
implemented.
A. Response DuringIraq's Occupation of Kuwait
The U.N's initial response to Iraq's invasion was to condemn
Iraq's actions, demand its immediate withdrawal, and impose
economic sanctions. When these strategies failed, the United
Nations authorized military action and announced Iraq's liability
for damages arising from the invasion and occupation.
1. Condemnation and
September 25, 1990

Economic

Sanctions,

August

2

to

The Iraqi army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The
response of the United Nations was immediate. That very day,
the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 660, condemning
15
the invasion and demanding Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg.,
15.
S/RES/660 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1323, 1325 (1990).

1-2, U.N. Doc.
Resolution 660,

adopted 14-0 with Yemen abstaining, also called on Iraq and Kuwait to begin
immediate, intensive negotiations to resolve their differences. Id. For a
discussion of various countries' views regarding sanctions, see Christopher C.
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When Iraq did not immediately withdraw, the Security Council took
additional measures. On August 6, the Council adopted Resolution
661, which embargoed Iraq and Kuwait, froze their assets, and urged
states to support the legitimate government of Kuwait. 16
Neither the disapprobation of Resolution 660 nor the economic
sanctions of Resolution 661 deterred Iraq's aggression. In fact, Iraq
declared its "comprehensive and eternal merger" with Kuwait. 17 The
Security Council's response to Iraq's entrenchment was two-fold:
First, the Council passed resolutions directed to Iraq that reiterated
the Council's condemnation.' 8 Second, it called on member states to
deploy maritime forces to enforce the Resolution 660 embargo and to
document their support of the economic sanctions imposed by
Resolution 661.19 Iraq still showed no sign of capitulation.
In mid-September, the Council expressed its growing concern
over living conditions in Iraq and Kuwait" ° and its outrage over

Joyner, Sanctions, Compliance and International Law: Reflections on the United
Nations'ExperienceAgainst Iraq,32 VA. J. INT' L. 1, 17-26 (1991).
16.
S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg.,
3-4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/661 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990). Resolution 661 was
adopted 13-0, with Cuba and Yemen abstaining. Id. Although the resolution
barred most exports from or imports to Iraq and Kuwait, the Council excepted
medical supplies and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs.
Id.
Additionally, Jordan continued to import oil from Iraq with the knowledge of the
U.N. Security Council Committee established by Resolution 661. Paul Conlon,
How Legal Are Jordan'sOil Importsfrom Iraq?, 6 J. TRANSNATL L. & POLY 109, 10910 (1996).
17.
S.C. Res. 661, supranote 16.
18.
S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/662 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1327, 1328 (1990); S.C. Res. 664, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990), reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1328, 1329 (1990). The Council adopted Resolution 662 on August 9,
1990 (15-0), again demanding Iraq's withdrawal and declaring the annexation

"null and void." S.C. Res. 662, supra. In Resolution 664, adopted August 18,
1990 (15-0), the Council demanded that Iraq allow third state nationals to leave

Iraq and Kuwait and reinstate diplomatic immunity to diplomatic and consular
personnel. S.C. Res. 664, supra.
19.
S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/665 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1329, 1330 (1990). Resolution 665,
passed August 25, 1990 (13-0 with Cuba and Yemen abstaining), activated the
Military Staff Committee (MSC), a body created by the U.N. Charter to advise the
Security Council on military matters. Although the MSC had lain dormant for 40
years, it held informal meetings in September 1990 concerning the Gulf crisis.
Ultimately, however, the MSC played no significant role in resolving the situation.
Joyner, supranote 15, at 17.
20.
S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/666 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1330, 1331 (1990). In Resolution 666,
adopted September 13, 1990 (13-2, Cuba and Yemen opposed), the Council noted
its concern over food shortages in those countries and requested that the
Secretary General seek information regarding food supplies and the treatment of

506

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:499

Iraq's treatment of diplomatic personnel in Kuwait.2 1 The Council
particularly objected to abductions from diplomatic premises in
Kuwait and stated that Iraq's escalating violations of international
law constituted "a flagrant violation of its international obligations

which strike at the root of the conduct of international

relations."2 2 The Council noted its decision to "take further
concrete measures [as soon as possible] to ensure Iraq's
compliance with the Council's resolutions" and reminded member
states of their obligation 23
to observe strictly the Council's prior
resolutions regarding Iraq.
A week later, the Council took measures to begin relief efforts
in Iraq and Kuwait, 2 4 while noting its determination to "ensure
compliance with Security Council resolutions by maximum use of
political and diplomatic means." 25 The Council reminded member
states of their obligations under Resolution 66126 and warned
Iraq that continued failure to comply with the Council's
resolutions "could lead to further serious action by the Council
under the Charter of the United Nations . . ."27 With those

children, pregnant women, the sick, and the elderly. The Council anticipated that
food and medical supplies would be provided through the U.N. and humanitarian
agencies such as the Red Cross. Id.
21.
S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/667 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1332, 1333 (1990). Resolution 667 was
adopted September 16, 1990 (15-0).
22.
Id. For a discussion of the brutality of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, see
Adel Omar Asem, Establishment of the U.N. Compensation Commission: The
Kuwaiti Government Perspective, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION,
supranote 12, at 45, 46-55.
23.
S.C. Res. 667, supranote 21.
24.
S.C. Res. 669, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2942d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/669 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1333 (1990). Resolution 669 was
adopted September 24, 1990 (15-0).
25.
S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/670 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1334, 1334-36 (1990). Resolution 670,

adopted September 25, 1990 (14-1, Cuba opposed), emphasized that flights into
or out of Kuwait and Iraq were forbidden under Resolution 661 and that states
were to ensure that their aircraft complied. Id. at 1335; see also Lisa Beyer, The
Battle Beckons: With Sanctions Serving Only to Increase Saddam'sBelligeranceand
the West Struggling to Fathom His Thinking, War Looks More and More Inevitable,
TIME, Oct. 8, 1990, at 26 (observing that Hussein's belligerence had not deterred
the U.N. Security Council from strengthening its opposition to him, and
concluding that, therefore, Resolution 670 was more symbolic than practical in its
significance).
26.
S.C. Res. 670, supra note 25, at 1336. Resolution 670 reminded
states to deny entry to Iraq-registered ships and to maintain their freeze on Iraqi
assets, both required by Resolution 661. The Council noted it would take
measures "directed at the State in question" to prevent any breach of these
resolutions. Id.
27.
Id. at 1335.
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place, the Council ended its August-September

2. Security Council Resolutions, October 29 to November 29,
1990

Despite the disapprobation of the international community,
as expressed by the Security Council, and despite the economic
sanctions imposed by the Council, Iraq continued its subjugation
of Kuwait during October 1990. Living conditions deteriorated as
the occupying forces took hostages, destroyed demographic
records, seized public and private property, and threatened thirdstate nationals, including diplomatic personnel.2 9

The Kuwaitis

30
and third-state nationals lacked food, water, and basic services.

Upon reconvening to respond to this situation, the Security
Council reminded Iraq of its August and September resolutions
and stressed in Resolution 674 "the urgent need for the
immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from
Kuwait, [and] for the restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty,

independence and territorial integrity.. .. "-1
Resolution 674 focused primarily on Iraq's duties under
international law, rather than on other states' obligations to
uphold economic sanctions. It listed many actions the Council
wanted Iraq to take. In light of Iraq's three-month-long refusal to
capitulate, however, this list primarily served to document the
Council's warning rather than to outline actions Iraq might

28.
See, e.g., George J. Church, Saddam's Strategies: With Most of the
World Arrayed Against Him, Could the Iraqi Leader Break the Embargo-or Even

Achieve His Goals in War?, TIME, Oct. 1, 1990, at 50. By the end of September,
Iraq reportedly had increased its forces in and around Kuwait to 360,000 men
and 2800 tanks. Id. Iraqi troops within strildng distance of Saudi Arabia totalled

430,000. Beyer, supra note 25. For a discussion of specific atrocities, see Louise
Lief & Peter Cary, Rebuilding a Ruined Nation, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 11,
1991, at 2628; David Gergen, The Barbarities of Hussein, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REp., Oct. 1, 1990, at 96 (reporting allegations that Iraqi troops looted hospitals of
supplies and equipment; evicted hundreds of patients from critical care facilities
and mental hospitals; tortured and killed animals at Kuwait's national zoo; and
conducted rapes and executions in a campaign intended to depopulate Kuwait).
Mortimer B. Zuckerman echoed Gergen's report of genocide:
"The Kuwaiti
population has been decimated[;] it's now less than 200,000 while there are
300,000 hostile Palestinians still in Kuwait." Why Hussein Smells Victory, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 24, 1990, at 67. Zuckerman doubted the Kuwaitis'
ability to repulse Iraq's "million-man Army." Id.
29.
See S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg.,
8, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/674 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1561, 1562 (1990). The preamble to
Resolution 674 cites these and other examples of unlawful activity. Resolution
674 was adopted October 29, 1990 (13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining).
30.
Id. at 1563.
31.
Id. at 1561.
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actually take. Yet, it preceded a more potent warning that was
the most important innovation of Resolution 674. This warning
specified that, under international law, Iraq was liable "for any
loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third
States, and their nationals and corporations, as a result of the
"32 It
invasion and illegal occupation of Kuwait by Iraq ...
further provided that states should collect information regarding
their claims and those of their nationals and corporations to
obtain restitution or financial compensation from Iraq. 3 3 The
Council concluded it would remain "actively and permanently
seized of the matter until Kuwait has regained its independence

and peace has been restored.

.

..

"34

Despite the nine resolutions the Security Council adopted
between August 3 and October 29, 1990, Iraq continued to
occupy Kuwait. By enacting Resolution 670, the Council had
exhausted all peaceful strategies within its power to deter this
aggression. Both humanitarian and economic appeals had failed,
and Kuwait's situation continued to deteriorate.
In late
November, the Council adopted its final resolutions directed at a
non-interventionist approach to the occupation.
The first of these, Resolution 677, 3 _ focused on Iraq's
genocidal activities against the Kuwaiti people.3 6 It condemned
37
both the genocide and the attendant destruction of civil records
and requested that the Secretary-General take custody of a
certified copy of Kuwait's population register.3 8
The second,
Resolution 678, 3 9 reflected the Security Council's growing
impatience with Iraq and provided it with a last warning. In
Resolution 678, the Council demanded "that Iraq comply fully
with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant

resolutions" . . . and provided Iraq "one final opportunity, as a
pause of goodwill [sic], to do so . . ."40
Furthermore, it
authorized member states cooperating with Kuwait "to use all

32.

33.

Id. at 1563.
Id.

34.
Id.
35.
S.C. Res. 677, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2962d mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/677 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1564 (1990).
Resolution 677 was
adopted November 28, 1990 (15-0).
36.
Id. The Council stated it was "[giravely concerned at the ongoing
attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of
Kuwait...." Id.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg.,
1, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/678 (1990), reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1565, 1565 (1990). Resolution 678 was
adopted November 29, 1990 (12-2-1, Cuba and Yemen opposed, China

abstaining).
40.
Id.
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necessary means to uphold and implement... [these] resolutions
and to restore international peace and security in the area... .41
The Iraq-related Security Council resolutions of fall 1990 are
remembered
popularly
as
the
resolutions
authorizing
international military action against Iraq. The Persian Gulf War
that followed these resolutions was the brief and decisive result of
Resolution 678. Among international arbitrators, however, these
resolutions are best remembered for providing the basis for Iraq's
liability to those victimized by the invasion and occupation. 4 2 The
claims process that began in 1991 and continues today is the
legacy of Resolution 674.
B. Post-Cease-FireResponse
In this second phase of its response to Iraq's invasion, the
United Nations set forth the terms required for peace and outlined
the procedures through which it planned to compensate Iraq's

victims.
1. Defining the Terms of Peace, March 2 to April 3, 1991
On January 16, 1991, a thirty-nation coalition launched its

military initiative to liberate Kuwait. 4 3 By February 27, President

Bush declared the coalition had achieved this goal, 44 and the

Persian Gulf War was over. 45

41.

Id.

42.

The arbitrators are not alone in this assessment:

President

George

Bush maintained

that

Iraq was responsible

for

reparations and compensation. At a news conference, President Bush
stated, in regard to the UNSC resolutions, "One of them relates to
reparations, and reparations is [sic] a very important part of this. It is a
very important part of what the United Nations has done."
Gregory Townsend, Comment, The Iraq Claims Process: A ProgressReport on the
United Nations Compensation Commission & U.S. Remedies, 17 LoY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 973, 977 (1995) (citations omitted). Saddam Hussein sneered at such
announcements, calling President Bush "the Satan in the White House." Strobe
Talbott, A Storm Erupts: As the Bombs Fell and Missiles Flew, Hopes for a New
World OrderGave Way to FamiliarDisorder,TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 14, 15.
43.
See generally, e.g., The Six-Week War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar.
11, 1991, at 5873 (providing a week-by-week summary of Gulf War events);
George J. Church, So Far,So Good: The Air War Gets Off to an Impressive Start,
TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 18, 20; Bill Javetski et al., The Gulf- A Special Report,
Bus. WK., Jan. 28, 1991, at 26.
44.
Bill Javetski et al., Winning the Peace: A Stable Mideast Will Be Harder
to Achieve than Military Victory, BUS. WK., Mar. 11, 1991, at 24.
45.
See, e.g., George J. Church, The 100 Hours: In a Battle for the History
Books, The Allies Break the Iraqi Army--Quickly, Totally, and at Unbelievably Low
Cost, TME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 22, 31.
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On March 2, 1991, the U.N. Security Council formally
acknowledged the end of the Persian Gulf War by adopting
Resolution 686. 46 Resolution 686 reaffirmed the twelve 1990
resolutions supporting Kuwaiti sovereignty and condemning Iraq's
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Thus, in Resolution 686, the
Security Council demanded that Iraq rescind its actions
purporting to annex Kuwait; release the Kuwaiti and third-state
nationals it had detained; return all Kuwaiti property; and, most
significantly with regard to the claims tribunal, "[a]ccept in
principle its liability under international law for any loss, damage,
or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third States, and their
nationals and corporations, as a result of the invasion and illegal
In addition to these
occupation of Kuwait by Iraq." 47
Iraq cease all hostile
that
demanded
Council
the
recapitulations,
arrange a military
states;
member
against
or provocative actions
and return the
of
war
cease-fire post haste; release all prisoners
in identifying
assist
and
remains of deceased military personnel;
in
Iraqi explosive, chemical, and biological weapons remaining
48
Iraq.
of
areas
occupied
and
waters,
adjacent
Kuwait, its
Initially, Iraq seemed prepared to comply with these terms

and conditions. In a letter of March 3, 1991, Iraqi Deputy Prime

Minister Tariq Aziz informed the President of the Security Council
49
that Iraq agreed to fufill its obligations under Resolution 686.

46.

S.C. Res. 686, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2978th mtg.,

2(b), U.N. Doc.

Resolution 686 was
S/RES/686 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 567 (1991).
adopted 11-1, with Cuba dissenting and China, India, and Yemen abstaining. Id.
(Background/Content Summary). For a discussion of damage, see Lief & Carey,
supra note 28. Lief & Carey note, for example, that when the Iraqis left Kuwait,
they retreated in
an orgy of murder and senseless destruction.... More than 600 oil fires
[Retreating
the Iraqis had ignited belched clouds of toxic smoke ....
soldiers] turned the National Museum into a pile of rubble and burned
libraries and palaces.... [Tihey dumped the horribly mutilated corpses of
tortured Kuwaitis in the streets and abducted thousands more citizens.
Id.
Among Lief & Carey's graphic descriptions of atrocities is that of Iraqi medics
draining blood from Kuwaiti citizens and transfusing it into wounded Iraqi
soldiers. Id.
S.C. Res. 686, supranote 46. Professor David J. Bederman describes
47.
this demand, and Iraq's accession to it, as "[o]ne of the least-noticed aspects of
the U.N. offer of armistice terms to prostrate Iraq. . . ." Bederman, 1994, supra
note 12, at 1.
S.C. Res. 686, supranote 46.
48.
United Nations: Security Council Resolution on Requirements to End
49.
Hostilities in Iraq, 30 I.L.M. 567 (1991) (citing U.N. Doc. S/22320 (1991))
[hereinafter Requirements to End Hostilities]. See generally Peacefire: United
Nations Imposes HarshPeace Settlement on Iraq, ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1991, at 39

[hereinafter Peacefire].
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On March 5, the Iraq Revolution Command Council formally
reversed its position that Iraq had effectively annexed Kuwait.5 0
Two weeks later, the Iraqi permanent representative to the United
Nations informed the Secretary-General that Iraq was prepared to
return all Kuwaiti property it had seized and was awaiting
instructions as to how this should b6 accomplished. s l
Notwithstanding these promising indications, it was soon

apparent that Iraq's seeming capitulation was mere pretense.
Despite Iraq's promises regarding the return of prisoners, bodies,
and property, Iraq neither accounted for missing persons nor
returned stolen property.5 2 Furthermore, although Iraqi troops

were no longer attacking Kuwait, they were now directing their
aggressions against domestic insurgents. Iraqi forces reportedly
prevented food and medical supplies from reaching Kurdish and
Shiite populations, bombed oilfields in rebel-held regions, and
attacked civilian protesters.5 3
Although these acts were not
specifically prohibited by the Security Council's resolutions
regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, they were not consistent with
the good faith adoption of the cease-fire agreement, and they
posed disturbing questions about Iraq's intentions. Additionally,
Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its own civilians violated
54
international agreements to which Iraq had been a party.

50.
Requirements to End Hostilities, supra note 49 (citing U.N. Doc.
S/22342 (1991)). The decision, forwarded to the President of the Security Council
and the Secretary-General, stated that the Command Council thereby "nullified
all ... decisions regarding Kuwait made subsequent to August 2, 1990, and
abrogated and nullified all measures made thereunder."
51.
Id. (citing U.N. Doc. S/22355 (1991)).
52.
S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg.,
16, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (1991), reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 846, 848 (1991).
53.
Rebels Accuse Saddam of Using Napalm, FT. WORTH STAR TELEGRAM,
Mar. 22, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL 3827333 [hereinafter Rebels]. The
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a coalition of groups
opposing Saddam Hussein, reported various abuses committed by Iraqi troops,
including the use of artillery, napalm, and chemical weapons against civilians. Id.
The Assembly stated, for example, that Iraqi troops attacked the Shiites' most
sacred city, Najaf, killing 15,000, and that troops killed large numbers in Kirkuk

by using helicopters to drop acid on demonstrators. Id. The Assembly also stated
that Iraqi special forces kidnapped Grand Ayatollah Abul-Hassan al-Khoei, the
world's highest Shiite authority. Id.
54.
S.C. Res. 687, supra note 52. Iraq had previously agreed to follow the
Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 94 L.N.T.S. 2138
(1929), 14 I.L.M. 49 (1975); the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, G.A. Res. 2373, 7 I.L.M. 809 (1968); and the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, G.A. Res. 2826, Annex,
11 I.L.M. 309 (1972). The Security Council knew that, during the Gulf War, Iraq
had repeatedly used, attempted to use, and threatened to use weapons in
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Disturbing as they were, these concerns were only part of the
impetus behind Security Council Resolution 687.55 The U.N.'s
concern for the Iraqi people provided the rest.
The U.N.
Secretary-General had sent a special envoy to assess conditions
in Iraq immediately after the Security Council passed Resolution
686.56 The report based on that week-long visit stated that the
allied forces had "battered Iraq back into 'a pre-industrial age' "57

and that allied bombing had "reduced Iraq to 'near apocalyptic
conditions.' "58 Leader of the U.N. team Secretary General Mart-ti
Ahtisaari reported, "It is unmistakable that the Iraqi people may

soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include

epidemic and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not
rapidly met."5 9
Addressing both Iraq's recalcitrance toward its Resolution
686 commitments and its failure to address its population's

violation of these agreements. The Council was concerned about certain post-war
activities that suggested that future violations were probable and imminent.
55.
S.C. Res. 687, supra note 52. Resolution 687 was adopted 12-1 on
April 3, 1991, with Cuba dissenting and Ecuador and Yemen abstaining.
56.
U.N. to Lift IraqiFood Embargo, CALGARY HERALD, Mar. 22, 1991, at A3,
availablein 1991 WL 755977 [hereinafter Food Embargo]. U.N. sources confirmed
that the envoy's unreleased report noted:
[A]Ul internal and external telephone systems have been destroyed and...
communication in Iraq is on a "person-to-person" basis. Government food
allocations are at 39 percent of the pre-sanctions level and the flow of food
through the private sector has been reduced to a "trickle." Bombardment
paralysed oil and electricity sectors almost entirely and transportation is
severely affected by lack of spare parts, tires and fuel.
IcL
57.
Rebels, supranote 53.
58.
U.N. Panel Takes Restrictions Off Food Imports for Iraq: 'Pre-Industrial
Age' Assessment of Nation Prompts the Action, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 23, 1991, at
All, availablein 1991 WL 3762899.
59.
Food Embargo, supra note 56. Ahtisaari's report warned of possible
epidemics of cholera, typhoid, meningitis, and diarrhea, as well as of the
possibility of widespread famine. By the time the U.N. envoy visited Iraq, food
prices had increased by 1000 percent, incomes had collapsed, reserves of food
staples were depleted, and the grain harvest was threatened by a lack of
irrigation, pesticides, and fertilizers. Id.
Ahtisaari reported that the necessities of modern life
have been destroyed or rendered tenuous; ... [that] [i]t will be difficult, if
not impossible to remedy these immediate humanitarian needs without
dealing with the underlying need for energy....
Otherwise, food that is
imported cannot be preserved and distributed; water cannot be purified;
sewage cannot be pumped away and cleansed, crops cannot be irrigated;
medicaments cannot be conveyed where they are required.
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humanitarian needs, the Security Council passed Resolution
687.60
Regarding the Iraqis' humanitarian ideals, the Council
acknowledged the gravity of the special envoy's reports on Iraq
and noted its desire to "meet urgently the humanitarian needs in
Kuwait and Iraq."61 To that end, the Council lifted the sanctions
against the sale or supply to Iraq of foodstuffs and simplified the
procedure through which Iraq could obtain materials and
supplies for essential civilian needs. 62 The Council also provided
for allowing Iraq to resume exporting commodities and products
under Council supervision.6
Regarding Iraq's commitments under Resolution 686, the
Council made explicit its concerns about Iraq's unprovoked
missile attacks, 64 its nuclear weapons program, 65 and its other
"manifestations of international terrorism."6 6 Accordingly, the
Council reaffirmed the importance of the preceding thirteen
resolutions concerning Iraq and Kuwait, 6 7 demanded that Iraq
respect
its
previous
agreements
concerning
Kuwait's

60.
See A Tough U.N. Vote to Disarm Iraqis: Security Council Agrees to
Impound Some Oil Revenue to Pay Reparationsfor War's Damage, S.F. EXAMINER,
Apr. 3, 1991, at Al, available in 1991 WL 8929155 [hereinafter Tough U.N. Vote].
This 3700-word cease-fire agreement was the longest and most detailed
resolution of this nature in Security Council history. Iraq's acceptance of it would
lead to an automatic cease-fire and a lifting of the U.N.-imposed embargo.
Rejection would result in the embargo's remaining in effect. Kuwaiti ambassador

Mohammad Abulhasan commented, "[Saddam had] better (accept it) if he wants
to save his people from further catastrophe," but Iraqi ambassador Abdul Amir alAnbari called it "very bad" and "unfair." Id. Anbari complained the resolutions
went "beyond the mandate of the Security Council" and stated, "America and its
allies should bear the full responsibility for their excesses. The new world order
is the order of the American authority over all the world." Id.
61.
S.C. Res. 687, supra note 52, at 849 (citing the Secretary-General's
reports of March 20, 1991, U.N. Doc. S/22366, and March 28, 1991, U.N. Doc.
S/22409).
62.
Id. at 852-53.
63.
Id,
64.
Id. at 848. The Council noted its awareness of "the use by Iraq of
ballistic missiles in unprovoked attacks and therefore of the need to take specific
measures in regard to such missiles located in Iraq." Id.
65.
Id. The Council was concerned by reports "in the hands of Member
States that Iraq has attempted to acquire materials for a nuclear-weapons
programme contrary to its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968." Id.
66.
Id. at 849. The Council noted that the International Convention
Against the Taking of Hostages categorizes all hostage-taking as a "manifestation]
of international terrorism," and chastised Iraq for taking hostages and threatening
international terrorism during the Gulf War. Id.
67.
Id.
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boundaries, 68 approved the deployment of a U.N. observer unit to
the Iraq-Kuwait border, 6 9 and demanded that Iraq surrender its
nuclear weapons, as well as its longchemical, biological, and
70
range ballistic missiles.
Further, the Council reaffirmed that Iraq "is liable under
international law for any direct loss, damage, including
environmental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or
injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a
result of [its] unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait," and
created a fund to pay compensation for the resultant claims, to be
by a U.N. commission established for that
administered
71
purpose.

68.
Id. The Council referred Iraq to the Agreed Minutes Between the State
of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly
Relations, Recognition, and Related Matters which both countries signed in 1963
and registered with the United Nations. In that document, Iraq and Kuwait
agreed on their mutual boundary, which had been previously memorialized in
correspondence between Iraq's prime minister and the ruler of Kuwait in 1932.
Id.
Id. at 850.
69.
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 852. Two significant influences on the compensation system
were the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal and American mass tort claims
administration. Ken Myers, Gulf War Continuingfor U.S. Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., June
20, 1994, at Al; see also Curt M. Dombek, The Twilight Zone of International
Arbitration, 21 No. 4 LITIG. 42 (1995).
The UNCC is to a certain degree influenced by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal
(IUCT). See Carlos Alzamora, The U.N. Compensation Commission: An Overview,
in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supranote 12, at 3, 4-5 (noting
it creators included people who had worked on the IUCT); Charles N. Brower, The
Lessons of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims TribunaL How May They Be Applied in the
Case of lraq?, 32 VA. J. INTL L. 421 (1992); Gregory D. DiMeglio, Claims Against
Iraq: The U.N. Compensation Commission and Other Remedies, 86 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PROc. 477, 478 (1992) (recording the remarks of Richard B. Lillich and Charles
N. Brower concerning the UNCC, as compared to the IUCT).
The IUCT, created in 1981 by agreement between Iran and the United States,
is a bilateral commission charged with adjudicating private claims against Iran
arising out of the Iranian revolution of 1979-80. Myers, supra. Plaintiffs include
businesses that closed and individuals who fled when the Ayatollah Khomeini
acceded to power. At that time, 45,000 Americans in Iran felt pressured to leave.
Id. As of 1994, Iran had agreed to pay approximately 4000 claimants several
billion dollars. Id. For a more extensive comparison of the two systems, see
Charles N. Brower, The Lessons of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Applied to Claims
Against Iraq, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 12, at
15 (comparing the two systems regarding right of confrontation, susceptibility to
political influences, working relationships of jurists, prioritization of claims, and
funding).
In addition to relying on the model of the IUCT, the UNCC also adopted some
features of American mass tort claims administration, including the notion that
environmental damage is recoverable. Professor Francis E. McGovern, a leading
authority on mass tort claims, advised the UNCC on these matters. Myers, supra;
see also McGovern, supra note 12, at 191-203.
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2. Instituting Compensation Procedures, May 20 to August 15,
1991
In May 1991, the U.N. Security Council began to shape the
formal mechanisms through which compensation claims would be
addressed. 7 2
In Resolution 692, 73 the Council recalled
Resolutions

674, 7 4

686, 7 5 and

687,76

and

again restated

its

position that Iraq would be held liable for losses, damage, and
77
injuries arising out of its invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
The Council reaffirmed that the Secretary-General would
undertake steps to formulate a recommendation to the Council
regarding the level of Iraq's contribution to the fund and directed

the Governing Council to proceed to implement Resolution 687. 78
Specifically, the Security Council provided that the proceeds from

all Iraqi petroleum exports after April 3,

proceeds

from

certain

prior exports,

1991, as well as the

would

attachment with regard to the compensation

be

subject to

fund.7 9

Finally, the

Security Council decided that, if the Governing Council notified
them that Iraq had failed to carry out its obligations, the Security

Council would reimpose the ban on Iraq's oil exportation and any
80
related transactions.
In

the weeks following the adoption of Resolution 692,

variety of proposals were

made concerning

a

the percentage of

Iraq's oil revenue to be contributed to the compensation fund.
The United States initially demanded a fifty percent contribution,
but U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar advocated thirty

72.
See, e.g., The Dunning of Saddam Begins, TIME, May 6, 1991, at 49
[hereinafter Dunning Begins]. By early May 1991, the United Nations had
concluded that Iraq's oil revenues would be used to compensate the thousands of
companies and individuals who had lost billions of dollars during Iraq's war on
Kuwait. It remained unsettled what percentage of these future revenues would be
used. The United States had frozen Iraqi assets totalling $1-1.5 billion, but
neither Iraq nor its creditors could access those assets. Id.
As of May 6, 1991, the U.S. Treasury Department had registered
approximately 1000 claims against Iraq. Id. These included a judgment of $64
million awarded by a U.S. district court to Consarc Corporation, a New Jersey
furnace manufacturer. Id.
73.
S.C. Res. 692, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2987th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/692 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 864 (1991).
Resolution 692 was
adopted May 20, 1991, 14-0, with Cuba abstaining.
74.
See supranote 29 and accompanying text.
75.
See supranote 46 and accompanying text.
76.
See supranote 52 and accompanying text.
77.
S.C. Res. 692, supranote 73.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
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percent. 8 ' Some members of the UNCC proposed beginning with
a figure below thirty percent but raising the percentage as
conditions improved in Iraq. The United States countered that
proposal by suggesting that a thirty percent contribution would
be an acceptable starting figure, but that it should be increased
as Iraq's economic status improved. 8 2 Ultimately, the United
States joined its allies in supporting a proposal precluding Iraq
from selling oil until its weapons of mass destruction were
destroyed and requiring a thirty percent contribution of the
proceeds.83
These proposals were formalized in Resolution 705, which the
4
Security Council adopted unanimously in August 1991.8

Resolution 705 adopted the Secretary-General's proposed figure of
a thirty percent maximum for the annual value of petroleum and
petroleum product exports from Iraq and provided that this
percentage would be reviewed periodically in light of relevant
85

developments.

III. THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN THEORY

In his May 2, 1991 report to the Security Council, the
Secretary-General
outlined a proposal for implementing
paragraph 18 of Resolution 687,86 i.e., for compensating victims

81.
David Mangan, Jr., U.S. May Ease Stand on Iraq Sanctions, OIL DAILY,
June 25, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WL 4862321; see also John M. Goshko,
U.S. Seeks Fast Paymentfrom Iraq, WASH. PosT, June 4, 1991, at A10 (reporting
that the United States and Kuwait advocated a 50% contribution).
82.
Mangan, supra note 81. As these negotiations continued, Iraq began
its own quest to obtain access to its frozen assets. For example, Iraq asked Japan
to unfreeze $140 million in oil payments blocked since the previous August. Id.
The Iraqi ambassador to Japan announced in a press conference, "A tragedy is
going on in my country. Tenns of thousands of children are in great danger of
death and urgently need food and medicine." Id.
83.
See U.S. Eases Stand on Iraqi Payments from Oil Revenues, OIL DAILY,
June 26, 1991, at 1, available in 1991 WVL 4862322. Although the proposal
provided for this percentage to be adjusted downward if market conditions
warranted, U.S. State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler said 30% "is
the minimum level to ensure there will be sufficient resources available to begin
the claims process." Id.
84.
See S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th mtg.,
1-2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/705 (1991), reprintedin 30 I.L.M. 1703, 1715 (1991). Resolution 705
was adopted August 15, 1991.
85.
See id. (citing the May 30, 1991, letter from the Secretary-General to

the President of the Security Council, S/2266 1).
86.
See Report of the Secretary-General on Claims Procedures Pursuantto
Paragraph19 of Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3004th
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/22559 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1703, 1706 (1991)
[hereinafter Report].
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of the Gulf War. In that report, the Secretary-General detailed
the institutional framework of the UNCC, which would consist of
a Governing Council, a secretariat, and commissioners. 87 He also
outlined the claims procedure and determined the method for
ensuring Iraq's contributions to a compensation fund would be

administered by the UNCC. 88 These specifics are pursuant to the
overarching goal of the UNCC: it "is not a court or an arbitral
tribunal before which the parties appear; it is a political organ
that performs an essentially fact-finding function of examining
claims, verifying their validity, evaluating losses, assessing
89
payments and resolving disputed claims."

In August 1991, the Governing Council adopted Annex II to
the Secretary-General's report, which categorized claims and set
90
the criteria for processing them.
These documents formed the basis for the Security Council's
adoption of Resolution 705. They continue to define the claims
process, in conjunction with subsequent decisions issued by the
Governing Council.
A. Structure and Compositionof the UNCC

87.
See id. at 1706-07.
88.
See id. at 1707-10.
89.
Id. at 1708. The Secretary-General noted that, because claimants
generally will not appear before the UNCC and because Iraq will not be allowed to
present defenses against claims, the UNCC must ensure that there is some
element of due process in the system. See id. The commissioners, described
below, are intended to provide this element.
This structure contrasts with the IUCT, at which plaintiffs' lawyers presented
their cases to panels consisting of an American jurist, an Iranian jurist, and a
chairperson from a third country. Dombek, supranote 71, at 42. Dombek notes
that "[w]ild stories abound" from these proceedings, "including rumors that
sometimes successful cross-examinations were followed not by a redirect, but
instead by threats of violence against the cross-examiner."
Id.; see also
Townsend, supranote 42, at 978-79. Dombek states that the United States' 10
years of experience with the IUCT led it to lobby for a U.N.S.C.-controlled
administrative commission, rather than a judicial body that Iraq could derail.
Dombek, supra. He notes also that the United States, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia
raised $57 million in seed money to establish the UNCC. Id.
90.
U.N. Compensation Comm'n Governing Council., 10th mtg., Annex 2,

U.N. Doc. S/22885 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1703, 1712 (1991) (annex to
August 2, 1991, letter from the President of the Governing Council to the
President of the Security Council) [hereinafter Annex 2]. The system adopted
departed from major elements of conventional international claims law and
practice. Critics argued the system was flawed because it was "imposed," was a
political rather than a judicial body, and exceeded the legitimate power of the
Security Council. For a discussion of these concerns, see John R. Crook, The
U.N.C.C. and its Critics: Is Iraq Entitled to Judicial Due Process, in THE UNITED
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supranote 12, at 77. For a discussion of the
origin and structure of the UNCC, see DiMeglio, supranote 71, at 482 (recording
the remarks of Ronald J. Bettauer, Assistant Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

518

[Vol. 31:499

The Secretary-General's May 2 report succinctly sets forth
the UNCC's institutional framework. It proposes, as the UNCC's
principal organ, a fifteen-member Governing Council comprising
The
the representatives of the current Security Council. 91
UNCC,
the
arm
of
policy-making
is
the
Council
Governing

charged with establishing guidelines for the claims procedure and
making final determinations
92
findings.

with

regard to

commissioners'

The Governing Council is assisted by commissioners who are
experts in fields such as finance, law, accountancy, insurance,
and environmental damage assessment. 93 The commissioners are
nominated by the Secretary-General and appointed by the
Governing Council for specific tasks and terms. 9 4 The particular
duties of the commissioners are to implement the guidelines of
the claims process, to resolve disputed claims, and to make
recommendations to the Governing Council, which will make final
determinations as required. 9 s
A secretariat, comprising an Executive Secretary and
the UNCC. In
necessary staff, provides administrative support for
96
fund.
compensation
the
administers
it
particular,
B. Categoriesof Claims and Proceduresfor Submission
An important consideration in constructing the claims
process was the desire to make rapid payment of the most urgent
claims. 97 To this end, the Governing Council concluded that
small individual claims should be processed first. 98 Furthermore,

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See Report, supranote 86, at 1706.
Id. at 1707.
Id. at 1706-07.
Id. at 1707.
See id.

96.

Id.

International claims commissions have been notoriously slow in
97.
settling claims. See, e.g., Bederman, 1994, supra note 12, at 15. For example,
one World War Two commission accepted U.S. internment claims until February
24, 1997 (sic). ABC Evening News (television broadcast, Jack Smith reporting,
Feb. 23, 1997).
In designing the UNCC, the U.N. Secretary-General was concerned with
improving the model provided by the IUCT, formed in 1981. Dunning Begins,
supra note 72. There, large institutional claims had been processed first, and
after 10 years many claims remained outstanding, although $5 billion had been
paid. Id.
Iran generated lengthy delays by defending against the claims asserted. See,
e.g., Myers, supranote 71. The UNCC's streamlined procedures do not afford Iraq
a comparable right. See supranote 89.
The "priority of paymenf question was contentious from the Governing
98.
Council's first session. See Ronald J. Bettauer, The United Nations Compensation
Commission-Developments Since October, 1992, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 420
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Rather, the

governments whose nationals had claims were instructed to
compile the claims and make one or more consolidated
submissions of all such claims in each category described by the
Council. 99 Governments were also allowed, at their discretion, to
submit claims on behalf of other persons resident in their
territories. 100
The Council charged the UNCC Executive Secretary with
circulating claims forms to governments, and each government
was urged to return the completed forms within six months from
the date they were provided. 1 0 ' In the interest of efficiency, the
claims forms were as simple as possible: they required only that
individual claimants identify themselves; give the amount, type,
and reason for each loss; provide any relevant available
documentation; and affirm the submission was correct.1l 2
Governments submitting claims were required only to affirm that,
on the basis of information available, the individual claimants
were their nationals or residents, and that they had
no reason to
10 3
believe the claimants' information was incorrect.

(1995).
The decision to pay individuals first contrasts with the IUCT's
prioritization. That tribunal paid banks and corporations first, then considered
the claims of individuals. Myers, supranote 71.
Some observers applaud the UNCC approach.
For example, Professor
Bederman, former Legal Assistant at the IUCT, has called the UNCC approach to
categorizing claims "extraordinarily sophisticated" and noted that 'some
commentators have put much stock in this process of sorting claims, and I am
inclined to concur that it is a notable effort .... " Bederman, 1994, supra note
12, at 22-23 (citations omitted). Professor Richard B. Lillich of the University of
Virginia commented: "[The UNCC] obviously decided they weren't going to make
that same mistake and turned it around ....

That's the way it should be.

[Businesses and banks] took the risk. That's the cost of doing business." Myers,
supra note 71.
Others, however, criticize it. Some see it as a "calculated public relations
gesture," Townsend, supra note 42, at 1005, whereas others view it as denying

justice for the primary victims: "[Processing individual claims first] has delayed
the processing of government claims representing a large part of the damage
suffered by the Kuwaiti people, the principal victims of Iraqi aggression for whose
benefit the U.N.C.C. presumably was constituted." Dombek, supranote 71, at 62.
99.
See Annex 2, supranote 90, at 1713-14.
100. See id. at 1713. For a discussion of claimants' eligibility and concerns
about "double-dipping," see Bederman, 1995, supranote 12, at 296-304.
101.
See Annex 2, supranote 90, at 1714. The U.S. process is outlined by
Marian Nash, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, in Claims Against
Iraq: United Nations CompensationCommission, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 346 (1992).
102. See Annex 2, supra note 90, at 1714. Some observers have criticized
the relaxed evidentiary standard applied to the expedited claims. See, e.g.,
Bederman, 1994, supra note 12, at 23; Dombek, supra note 71, at 62.
103. See Annex 2, supra note 90, at 1714. The UNCC had to decide
whether countries could submit claims on behalf of non-nationals to whom they
had extended protection. See Bederman, 1994, supra note 12, at 30-31. It
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Another concession to efficiency was the decision not to
scrutinize each individual claim. Instead, because of the large
volume of claims anticipated, commissioners were to verify
individual claims on a sample basis, inquiring further only if

circumstances warranted.I°4 The commissioners would report to
the Governing Council on the claims received and the amount
recommended for the claims submitted by each government. The
Council then would decide the total amount to be allocated to
for
each government, which in turn would be responsible
05
1
residents.
or
nationals
its
to
funds
the
distributing
Acknowledging that funds to pay these claims might not be
available as needed, the UNCC anticipated making pro rata
The
payments to governments as funds became available.
the
various
funds
among
Governing Council was to allocate
06
categories of claims and to decide on the priority of payments. 1
Having decided to address small individual claims first, the
Governing Council created four categories of such claims.
Category "A"or "departure" claims purported to compensate those
who had departed Iraq or Kuwait between August 2, 1990, and
March 2, 1991. Category "A" claimants who could provide simple
documentation of the fact and the date of departure from Iraq or
Kuwait would receive $2500, with no documentation of actual
07
loss required. 1
Category "B" was designed to cover losses suffered from
serious personal injury or from the death of a spouse, child, or
parent. In the case of serious personal injury, $2500 would be
provided where the claimant provided simple documentation of
the fact and the date of the injury. In the case of death, $2500
would be provided if there was simple documentation of the death
and of the family relationship. As with Category "A" claims, no
documentation of the actual amount of loss would be required. ' 0 8

allowed these submissions at each government's discretion. See, e.g., DiMeglio,
supra note 71, at 485 (quoting Bettauer); Nash, supra note 101, at 346. It also
had to decide whether Iraqis with dual citizenship could submit claims, and it
ultimately allowed them to do so. Townsend, supranote 42, at 1000-03.
104. SeeAnnex2, supranote 90, at 1713.
105. See id The UNCC limited the "processing fees" governments could
deduct from award payments and required governments to distribute funds to
claimants within six months of receiving them. The UNCC also required
governments to report their methods for allocating the funds and their progress in
doing so. See Bettauer, supranote 98, at 421.
106. SeeAnnex 2, supranote 90, at 1713.

107.

See id. Claims submitted under Category "A"could not be resubmitted

for a greater amount in any category. If the loss in question was greater than
$2500 and could be documented, it could be submitted under Category "C" or

other appropriate categories. See id.
108. See id- If the actual loss resulting from the death or injury was greater

than $2500, payments under Category "B"are to be considered interim relief, and
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Categories "C" and "D" addressed larger individual losses
with respect to death or personal injury; loss of income, support,
housing, or personal property; medical expenses; and costs of
departure.10 9 Category "C" is appropriate for losses of up to
$100,000, and Category "D" for losses over $100,000. To recover,
claimants must provide appropriate evidence of the circumstances
and amount of the alleged loss. 110
Ultimately, the Governing Council added two additional
categories to the four individual categories:"' "E" for corporate
claims and "F" for government claims.
Guiding decisions in all categories was the Council's list of
"Applicable Requirements." These requirements were generous
toward Iraq's victims, compensating "death, personal injury, or
other direct loss" as a result of: (1) "military operations or threat
of military action by either side between" August 2, 1990, and
March 2, 1991; (2) "departure from or inability to leave Iraq or

Kuwait (or a decision not to return) during that period;" (3)
actions taken by officials,

employees, or agents of Iraq in

connection with the invasion or occupation during the specified
period; (4) "the breakdown of civil order in Kuwait or Iraq" at that

time; or (5) "hostage-taking or other illegal detention.""

2

With

this expansive view of the compensable, a carefully wrought

structure, and operating funds provided by the United Nations,
the UNCC was ready to begin its work.

claims for additional relief may be submitted under Category "C" or other
appropriate categories. Id.
Additionally, Category "A" and "B" payments may be made cumulatively,
where more than one situation applies to a particular person, but no more than
$10,000 will be paid for death and no more than $5000 for departure with respect
to any one family (consisting of any person and his or her spouse, children, and
parents). Id.
109.
Id.
For an extended discussion of the "C" claim process, see
Christopher S. Gibson, Mass Claims Processing: Techniques for Processing Over
400,000 Claims for Individual Loss at the United Nations Compensation
Commission, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supra note 12, at
155, 167-84.
110.
See Annex 2, supra note 90, at 1713. Evidence required is the
reasonable minimum appropriate under the circumstances, and a lesser degree of
evidence is ordinarily required for smaller claims, such as those less than
$20,000. Id.
111.
See Criteria for Additional Categories of Claims, U.N. Compensation
Comm'n, 3d Sess., 18th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/23765 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 1045 (1992).
112.
Annex 2, supranote 90, at 1713; see also Marion Leich, Claims Against
Iraq: United Nations Compensation Commission, 86 AM. J. INTL L. 113 (1992)
(reciting claims criteria and discussing various Security Council resolutions
through October 1991).

522

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 31:499

IV. THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN PRACTICE

Despite its careful design, the UNCC has had only limited
success. To its credit, the Commission has elicited and processed
millions of claims in its seven-year history. Regrettably, however,
it has compensated relatively few of Iraq's victims.
A. 1991-93: Millions Filed, None Paid
From the outset, the structure of the UNCC and the decisions
of its Governing Council were influenced greatly by two factors:
the enormous number of potential claims and the likelihood that
1 13
funds would never be sufficient to satisfy these claims fully.
Despite these hurdles, the UNCC made substantial administrative
progress in its first two years. From July 1991 through June
1992, the Governing Council issued a series of decisions that
defined compensable losses, outlined the claims procedure, and
specified qualifications for commissioners.1 1 4 In July 1992, the
UNCC began accepting claims.
During its first year, the UNCC had worked hard to create
simple procedures that would readily allow victims to file claims.

Its success was immediately apparent: In the first seven months
of the filing period, 380,000 claims were filed; 115 a month later,
that number had risen to 400,000.116 Two problems had arisen,
as of February 1993, no commissioners had been
however:
appointed to process these claims, and, more significantly, Iraq
refused to comply with the terms under which it would be allowed
As President Clinton described the
to resume oil sales. 1 17
depends
situation, a[T]he availability of funds to pay claims ...
upon Iraq's resumption of oil sales under conditions acceptable to
the U.N.S.C. Iraq's failure to comply with the relevant aspects of
U.N.S.C. resolutions and U.N.S.C.R. 687 has precluded the lifting

113.
See David D. Caron, Introductory Note, United Nations Compensation
Commission: Report with Decisions of the Governing Council, 31 I.L.M. 1009
(1992); see also Crook, supra note 12, at 146 (reviewing the development of the

UNCC and its early decisions, with an emphasis on funding problems).
114. See Caron, supra note 113, at 1010-12.
115. See U.N. CompensationCommission: 380,000 Claims Filed So Far,8 No.
2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 22 (1993) [hereinafter 380,000 Claims].
116. See $264.3 Million Corp. Claim Filed with Compensation Commission, 8
No. 3 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 21 (1993). This included the UNCC's first corporate

claim, filed by Turkey's Enka Construction for $264.3 million. Id. Enka was in
the process of constructing the world's seventh largest hydroelectric dam in
Kurdistan when the Gulf War began. At the end of the war, the Kurds seized and
sold tens of millions of dollars of Enka's equipment. Id.
117.

See 380,000 Claims, supranote 115, at 22.
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of sanctions on the sale of Iraqi oil."1 18
Although the first
problem was rectified at the Governing Council's March 1993
meeting, the second would become a definitive blight on the
Council's success.
Undeterred by the apparent lack of funds, victims continued
to file claims.
By August 1993, the UNCC had received
approximately 920,000 claims.1 1 9 Although initially the UNCC
had set a July 1993 filing deadline, the unstanched flood of

claims persuaded the UNCC to extend the deadline until October

1, 1993.120 The UNCC hoped to submit claims to commissioners
the following December or January, with the hope that payments

would begin during the second half of 1994.121
By the revised October deadline, claims totalled 1,019,373,
with an asserted value of $15 billion. 12 2 Again, because of the
volume of claims, the Governing Council granted a three-month

extension to thirty countries filing "A," "B," and "C" claims. 123 By
12 4
the end of that period, December 31, 1993, 2.3 million claims
12 5
had been filed.

118. Status Report on Iraq's Non-Compliance with U.N. Resolutions, Apr. 5,
1993, U.S. DEPtr ST. DISPATCH 194, available in 1993 WL 2977363. President
Clinton wrote to Congress that
[t]he Iraqi government... has for months maintained a full embargo
against its northern provinces, in violation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 688, and has acted to distribute humanitarian supplies only to
its supporters and to the military. It has also refused to utilize the
opportunity under Resolutions 706 and 712 to sell up to $1.6 billion in oil,
proceeds from which could be used by Iraq to purchase [humanitarian]
supplies for essential civilian needs.
Id.
119. See Claims to U.N. Compensation Commission Hit 920,000, 8 No. 8
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 12 (1993) [hereinafter Claims Hit 920,000]. Most claims
were on behalf of individuals; a majority were Class "A." Id.
120. Id. At this time, the UNCC was preparing a special computer program
to process the "A" claims and was resolving problems caused by some
governments' failure to follow correct claims procedures. For example, "A" claims

were to be submitted on computer diskettes, but some governments had
submitted them on paper. Id.
121.
Id.

122.

See Claims to U.N. Compensation Commission Top One Million, S No. 10

MEALEY'S INT'LARB. REP. 10 (1993).

123.

Id. The extension to January 1, 1994 applied only to countries that

had already requested it. "D" claims were also due on January 1, 1994, with "E"
and "F" claims due on April 1, 1994 and May 1, 1994, respectively. Id.
124. These 2.3 million claims totalled $50 billion in damages, with total
claims of $100 billion expected.
See Jeffrey A. Jannuzzo, U.N. Clears
Compensation for Gulf War Victims, TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 1994, available in
1994 WL 9164007.
125.
See Compensation Commission: 2.3 Million Claims Filed, 9 No. 1
MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 8 (1994) [hereinafter 2.3 Million Claims]. Although the
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B. 1993-95: Embargo Continues,InternationalResolve Weakens
With the filing periods ended for "A," "B," "C," and "D" claims,
26
the commissioners lost no time beginning the next phase.2
Commissioners who received claims in December 1993 had
The commissioners'
processed them by April 1994.127
recommendations regarding the first batch of claims 12were
9
approved in May, 128 and the first awards were paid in June.
Despite this impressive beginning, the UNCC made no more
payments until October 1995.130 It had run into an obstacle that
its hard work and good intentions could not surmount: lack of
money to pay claimants. This problem derived from two sources:
first, Iraq's refusal to comply with its cease-fire obligations, which

filing deadlines had passed for "A," "B," 'C," and "D" claims, claims continued to
be filed. See id. By January, claims in each category were as follows: 850,000
"A" claims; 403,000 "B" claims; 230,000 "C" claims; 7000 "D" claims; 2000 "E"
claims; and 20 "F" claims. Id. One of the "C" claims was filed by Egypt on behalf
of 1.2 million displaced Egyptian workers. Id. The "Egyptian Workers' Claim," as
it came to be known, is sometimes counted as one claim, as in Mealey's
categorical breakdown, and sometimes counted as 1.2 million claims, as in
Mealey's headline. Id.
126.
One reporter observed: "It is 10 p.m. on a Sunday in Geneva. At a
building out near the airport, the lights are still on. The staff of the United
Nation's [sic] Gulf War claims commission is still at work. The overtime budget
has been exhausted, but the staff are working late anyway. Their sense of
urgency, even pleasure, resembles a political campaign rather than an
international bureaucracy. People will be there at 1 o'clock in the morning."
Jannuzzo, supranote 124.
127.
See ici. The UNCC set an internal deadline of 120 days within which it
was to decide each submission. Id.
128.
See U.N. Commission Makes FirstPaymentsfor Serious Injuries, 9 No. 6
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 11 (1994) [hereinafter First Payments]. At its May 26
meeting, the Governing Council approved 670 awards recommended in the
commissioners' April 14 report.
Id.
The Council also approved the
commissioners' recommendations that 307 claims be denied and 88 claims be
transferred to Category "C." Id.
129.
See id. The UNCC paid $2,747,500 via electronic transfer to receiving
agencies in 16 countries. Payments by country were as follows: Australia-

$2500; China-$5000; Slovak Repubic-$2500; France-$52,500; Iran-$2500;
Jordan--$982,500;
Kenya-$2500; Kuwait--$1,397,500;
Mauritius-$2500;
Pakistan-$22,500; Poland-$10,000; Sri Lanka-$110,000; Thailand-$10,000;
U.K.-$107,500; U.S.-$35,000; Yugosavia-$2500.
Id.; see also U.N.
Compensates First Victims ofIraqiInvasion, 40 No. 24 Arab. Press Serv. Diplomat
Rec. (1994), available in 1994 WL 2226248 [hereinafter First Victims].
Beneficiaries were all Category "B" victims who had been wounded by Iraqi
actions or had lost a close relative. Payments ranged from as much as $2500 per
individual to as much as $10,000 per family. See First Victims, supra.
130.
See UNCC Approves Payment of Serious Injury Claims, 10 No. 10
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 15 (1995) [hereinafter UNCC Approves Payment]. On
October 12, the Governing Council approved payment of $8,252,500 to satisfy
2577 previously approved Category "B" claims.
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precluded lifting the embargo; second, the refusal of all nations
except the United States to loan money to the UNCC.
1. Iraq's Recalcitrance
As noted above, 1 3 ' the U.N. Security Council in Resolution
661 had embargoed Iraq and frozen its extraterritorial assets in
August 1990. Initially, this resolution was intended to pressure
the Iraqis to withdraw from Kuwait. With Iraq's defeat in the Gulf
War, Resolution 661 obtained ambitious new purposes: to force
Iraq to comply with its cease-fire agreement to release
hostages, 13 2 to surrender its weapons of mass destruction,1 3 3 to
4 and to
identify dangerous weaponry abandoned in Kuwait, 13
35
assume liability for losses resulting from the Gulf War.1
In the immediate post-war jubilation over the allied forces'
success, observers were optimistic that the embargo would fulfill
this purpose.' 3 6 Commentators opined Iraq could not function
without oil revenues, and most of them believed Iraqi oil would
soon be sold in the world market again. Under U.N. Security

131.
See supratext accompanying note 16.
132. See supra text accompanying note 48.
133. See supratext accompanying notes 65, 70.
134. See supratext accompanying note 48.
135. See supratext accompanying notes 47, 71, 77.
136. Some observers were critical of the U.N. post-war treatment of Iraq,
analogizing it with the Allies' treatment of Germany after World War One. See,
e.g., Garmise, supra note 12, at 842-43. Tough U.N. Vote, supra note 60 ("The

resolution places an unprecedented economic and military stranglehold on Iraq,
prompting some critics to compare it with the draconian provisions of the Treaty
of Versailles ....

).

Others, however, insisted the situations were not analogous. As Jannuzzo, an

international lawyer who has practiced in the Middle East argued:
Though a parallel is often drawn with the German people's burdens after
World War I, Iraq should be considered differently. The allies imposed
obligations on the Germans that could be met only by taxing their labor.
But Iraq has a huge pool of literally liquid assets under its deserts that
can be garnished to pay the injured.
Garnishing oil reserves is morally different from taxing the labor of a
nation; it is more closely analogous to seizing money in bank accounts.
Jeffrey A. Jannuzzo, War ReparationsNeed Not Bleed Iraq's People Dry, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 12, 1991, at A18.
Jannuzzo advocated a system much like the one ultimately adopted. He
suggested garnishing a percentage of oil revenues that would balance Iraq's need
to rebuild with the needs of the injured. Specifically, Jannuzzo suggested
garnishing approximately 50% of each shipment of oil reserves, because that
figure approximated the percentage Iraq had been spending on its military in the
past decade and would leave Iraq the same percentage of oil revenue historically
available for civilian uses. Id.
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Council Resolution 692,137 these revenues would fund both Iraq's
substantial domestic needs and the UNCC's damage awards.
Unfortunately for the success
of the UNCC,
the

commentators and the Security Council had underestimated
Saddam Hussein's determination

38

and Iraq's resultant position

137.
See supratext accompanying notes 72-80.
138.
The embargo might have been an effective strategy against a rational
leader, but Hussein was not such a man. The founder of the CIA's center for
analyzing the psychology of world leaders argued that Hussein "exhibits a welldocumented syndrome known as malignant narcissism .. . " a syndrome that
includes "overarching arrogance and ambition." Beyer, supra note 25 (citing Dr.
Jerrold Post). One psychologist observed, "Saddam is not going to give up ....
The No. 1 thing for him is to maintain his grand sense of self. .. ." Id. (quoting
Dr. Vanik Volkan, director of the Center for the Study of the Mind and Human
Interaction at the University of Virginia Medical School).
Hussein's spending habits and legal decrees align with a diagnosis of
malignant narcissism. When Hussein rose to power in 1979, Iraq was one of the
Middle East's most prosperous economies; during the 1980s he plunged it into
bankruptcy. Peter Furhman, Robbin' Hood: If the World is at Last Rid of Saddam
Hussein, Iraqi Will Be Among Chief Beneficiaries, FORBES, Mar. 18, 1991, at 43.
While the gross domestic product fell by 75% and Iraq became a net importer of
food, Hussein spent more than $200 billion on the military. Id. In addition,
Hussein spent large sums celebrating himself:
[Iun the early 1980s, Saddam Hussein ordered all but the highest layer of
the ruins [of Nebuchadnezzar's hanging gardens] covered over again [after
the Germans and British had excavated them]. He built his own replica of
the king's palace atop the old one, laying bricks engraved with his name
alongside those with ancient inscriptions. Then he built a modem palace
overlooking the site. In case anyone still missed the point, the title of a
recent festival spelled it out:
"Babylon:
From Nebuchadnezzar to

Saddam."...
Modem Iraq truly is the Kingdom of Saddam: from the cramped homes
of Saddam City, to the spinning restaurant atop Saddam Tower, to

exhibits at Saddam Center for the Arts. Saddam has raised up a universe
of monuments to himself, from towering bronze statues to thousands of
billboard portraits.
Mark Dennis, Saddam's Nightmare, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 16, 1998 at 40, 41.
In 1986, Hussein announced that the death penalty would be imposed on
those who insulted him. U.N. Investigator Says Iraq Holds Own People Hostage;
Hussein Won't Sell Oil as Long as U.N. Insists on Monitoring Trade, BALT. SUN, Nov.
25, 1995, at 7A [hereinafter U.N. Investigatorj. In 1994, he announced that
amputations and brandings would be imposed for petty theft and desertion. Id.
Despite the destruction of his country's infrastructure and the suffering of his
people, Hussein built 15 palaces in the five years following the war. Nicholas
Bums, U.S. State Department Briefing (June 5, 1996), Fed. News Serv. Wash.
Package, June 5, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5794299.
When a reporter
suggested at a State Department briefing that Hussein was "just a wimp"
compared to other palace-builders, a spokesperson Bums replied, "He's not really
a wimp ....
[but] he's certainly evil." Id. (The palace-building may be more
practical that it long appeared; recent commentators suggest the "palaces" are in
fact factories for making biological weapons. See, e.g., Richard Haas, Interview
with Katie Couric, Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 15, 1998).
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regarding oil exportation. After six and a half years, and despite
critical domestic needs, 139 Hussein has refused to comply with
Security Council criteria; 14° thus, the embargo remains in effect.
With minor exceptions, no oil has been legally sold 14 1 and no oil
revenues have accrued to the Compensation Fund.' 4 2
In retrospect, those who doubted the effectiveness of
nonviolent economic sanctions have been proven correct. As one
advocate of military action noted before the war:
Those who say we should wait for sanctions to work are taking an
enormous gamble. They are betting that the sanctions will be
effective, that Hussein's response eventually will be reasonable or
that he will be deposed, that the international coalition can hold
together against the appeasers. The odds are not good .... 143

Similarly, the Economist's 1990 prognostication appears well
taken: Expecting Iraq to pay war reparations was "perfectly just
and wholly unrealistic." 14 4
2. Iraq's Frozen Assets and their Nominal Seizure
When it became clear that Iraq would not re-enter the oil
market quickly and generate funds for the UNCC, the Security
Council implemented a second plan through which it hoped to
139. See, e.g., Turning the Screw: The Effect of Trade Sanctions on Iraqi
Society, MIDDLE E., May 1, 1995, at 6 [hereinafter Turning the Screw] (noting the

humanitarian situation is "disastrous" while the embargo seems to have achieved
little regarding Iraqi disarmament or recognition of Kuwait, and urging the
Security Council "to reflect seriously on whether the price paid by ordinary people
is not too high for what has been achieved").
140. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Model Tribunal Plagued by Cash Woes:
Body Hearing Claims Against Iraq Ambitious but Underfunded, 81 A.B.A. J., Feb.
1995, at 30; Letter from Pres. William J. Clinton to the Speaker of the House of
Reps. & the Pres. pro tempore of the Senate, M2 Presswire, Jan. 5, 1996,
availablein 1996 WL 7890823; Letter from Pres. Bill Clinton to the Speaker of the
House of Reps. & the Pres. pro tempore of the Senate, M2 Presswire, May 7,
1996, availablein 1996 WL 10341847.
141. The United Nations never completely barred oil sales from Iraq to
Jordan. See Conlon, supra note 16, at 109.
142. By mid-1993, even the commodities market had stopped reacting to
periodic speculation that Iraqi oil sales might resume. UN/IraqiOil Sales Talks to
Resume Next Week, 71 No. 126 PLATr'S OILGRAM PRICE REP. 1 (1993) ("'It's just the
same old song and dance,' said a New York trader, adding that the market was
weary of studying the protracted and detailed UN/Iraq dispute over terms for
interim oil sales.").
143. Zuckerman, supranote 28.
144. Is War Receding?, ECONOMIsT, Dec. 8, 1990, at 45 (Iraq-Kuwait Crisis,
1990). When the UNCC made its first payments in 1994, a press report noted
without further comment: "The compensation fund draws its money from Iraqi
capital abroad frozen under the U.N. embargo imposed at the end of the war."
First Victims, supranote 129. The notion of garnishing oil revenues to pay these
claims had faded from popular consciousness.
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obtain finds: seizing Iraqi assets frozen abroad when Iraq invaded
Kuwait. Billions of dollars were frozen in such accounts. Seizing
them would not only generate funds for the UNCC, but would also
prevent funds from reaching Iraq,' 45 thus increasing pressure on
that country to comply with the terms prerequisite to lifting the
embargo.'14
This strategy seemed promising.
Iraq had already
approached Japan about obtaining assets frozen in Japanese
banks, 14 7 and when the U.N. Security Council began to formalize
its plan to seize the assets, Iraq signaled its discomfiture.
Attempting to negotiate an alternative, Iraq proposed that the
Security Council allow Iraq to sell $4 billion worth of oil and give a
14
portion to the UNCC. 8
The Council rejected this offer and adopted Resolution 778 in
October 1992.149 Resolution 778 enabled the United Nations to
confiscate frozen Iraqi funds and deposit them in an escrow
account authorized by Resolutions 706 and 712. Thirty percent
of proceeds from oil paid for after August 5, 1990, and proceeds of
oil belonging to Iraq would go to the Compensation Fund.' 50

145. Dunning Begins, supra note 72. By one count, Iraq had had three to
four billion dollars in foreign banks when the funds were frozen in August 1990.
Most of those funds were in U.S. banks. United Nations: Part of Iraq's Frozen
Assets Appropriated,Inter Press Serv. Oct. 2, 1992, availablein 1992 WL 2488762

[hereinafter Frozen Assets]. Another source estimated the frozen assets at $4-5

billion, with $2 billion of that frozen in the United States and the United Kingdom
and a substantial additional amount in Switzerland's Bank of International
Settlements.
DiMeglio, supra note 71, at 480 (recording Judge Brower's
presentation, InternationalLaw: On the Edge of Credibility in the Wake of Iraq's
Invasion and Occupationof Kuwait).
146.
The United States led the effort to develop the asset-seizure plan that
resulted in Resolution 778. Ronald J. Bettauer, Establishment of the United
Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective, in THE
UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, supranote 12, at 29, 35. Additionally,
the United States pledged to match all contributions into the escrow account up
to $200 million and transferred $200 million in frozen Iraqi assets to a holding
account at the New York Federal Reserve Bank for that purpose. Id.
147. Iraq's desire to reach these assets led it to ask Japan, in June 1991, to
unfreeze $140 million in oil payments blocked since the August invasion of
Kuwait. Mangan, supra note 81.
148.
The Bill Comes Due, TlIME, Oct. 12, 1992, at 29. Iraq became unwilling
to pursue this option when the United Nations said it would have to handle all the
money such sales would earn. Id.
149. This resolution, sponsored by Britain, France, Russia, the United
States, Hungary, and Japan, was approved 14-0, with China abstaining. Frozen
Assets, supra note 145. Jeffrey Jannuzzo had advocated seizing those assets
since the end of the war. See Jannuzzo, supranote 136.
150.
See 380,000 Claims, supra note 115; see also Frozen Assets, supra
note 145 (noting the United States considered the Resolution "a reasonable and
proportionate response to Iraq's intransigence" and quoting U.S. Ambassador
Edward Perkins as saying, "Iraq's refusal to accept resolutions 706 and 712 has
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The Commission had obtained $100 million from these funds
by February 1993, with $21 million going to the Compensation
Fund to allow it to reimburse loans from the United Nations and
cover its budget for the following year.15 1 Nevertheless, the billion
dollars the Council hoped to seize never materialized, and by
August it was clear the UNCC would glean only enough money to
continue operating-not enough to pay any claims.' 5 2 As of
January 1994, the UNCC's financial health had "not changed
much,"15 3 and an April 1995 report announced, "In contrast to
the UNCC's obvious accomplishments in processing claims, the
UN has made practically no progress in finding money with which
S4
to pay claimants."
The source of this problem was pragmatic, not philosophical.
While nominally supporting the seizure strategy of the United
Nations, most countries holding Iraqi assets preferred to continue
doing so and to pay claims being adjudicated in their domestic
courts.1 5 5 Although the frozen funds were to be repaid when Iraq

prevented its own population from receiving humanitarian relief... [. We] believe
that the Security Council was right in waiting no longer for Iraq to implement
these resolutions"; also noting China viewed the measure as extraordinary and
unnecessary, considering Iraq's willingness to negotiate, and quoting Chinese
Ambassador Li Daoyu as stating that "we should also like to point out that the
seizing of a country's frozen assets abroad is a matter that concerns the
sovereignty of that country and involves complicated legal implications.").
151.
See 380,000 Claims, supra note 115. The UNCC's budget included
staffing and the purchase of computer equipment. See also Townsend supranote
42, at 1013, n.289 (citing Ma Xiaolin, Compensation Troublesome Issue Left Over
by Gulf War, Xinhua News Agency, July 28, 1995, available in LEXIS, News
Library, WIRES File) (noting the UNCC's 1996 budget was $22.9 million, an 18%
reduction from its 1995 budget); UNCC Beginning to Receive Proceedsfrom Iraqi Oil
Sales, 12 No. 1 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 16 (1997) (noting the annual UNCC
budget is between $20-25 million). By 1997, the annual budget had risen again,
to $30 million. Future Award Payments from UNCC Compensation Fund are in
Doubt, 12 No. 7 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 20 (1997).
152.
See Claims Hit 920,000, supranote 119.
153.
See 2.3 Million Claims, supranote 125.
154.
U.N. Compensation Commission Approves Awards, Tackles Difficult
Claims, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 74, 75 (1995) [hereinafter Difficult
Claims].
155.
Many such claims were filed around the world. For example, in the
United States, the Treasury Department had registered 1000 U.S. claims against
Iraq by May 1991. Dunning Begins, supranote 72. One year later, that number
had risen to 1400 claims totalling "'billions of dollars' (the Treasury Department
[would] not be more specific)." DiMegilo, supranote 71, at 488 (quoting Daniel B.
Magraw, Associate General Counsel for International Activities at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency).
These claims were maling their way through civil courts as the UNCC
continued its work. In the most famous U.S. case, Consarc Corporation, a New
Jersey manufacturer, sued Iraq for fraud and breach of contract. In this case,
Iraq had ordered furnaces, stating they would be used to make artificial limbs;
they were actually intended to make nuclear weapons and missiles. When the
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began selling oil, Iraq's continued unwillingness to re-enter the oil
They did not want to
market worried these countries.
disadvantage their own citizens in favor of claimants chosen by
only the United States had
the United Nations,1 5 6 and by 1995
1 7
loaned Iraqi assets to the UNCC. 5
This lack of support posed a continuing problem for the
UNCC-one that required alternative solutions to be developed in
the face of an increasingly fragmented and unsupportive
international community.
3. Political Resolve Weakens
By May 1994, it was clear that neither imminent oil sales nor
the seizure of frozen assets would solve the UNCC's funding
U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
problem.158
proposed a third solution. Boutros-Ghali observed that Iraq had
exported a substantial volume of oil just before the Security
Council imposed sanctions, and that payment would not have
been completed when the sanctions took effect on August 6, 1990.

intended use was discovered by U.S. authorities, President Bush stopped
shipment of the furnaces. DiMeglio, supranote 71, at 482 (quoting Brower).
In that case, Consarc was awarded $64.1 million in damages. Id. The
Treasury Department refused to release funds to pay this award, stating, "We
prefer to freeze, not seize," Dunning Begins, supra note 72. The government
moved to have this judgment vacated. DiMeglio, supra note 71, at 482. The
judge did not vacate the judgment, but declined to decide whether Consarc could
recover the judgment from funds frozen at the Bank of New York. Id. at 482
(quoting Brower), at 488 (quoting Magraw). Similarly, in First City Texas-Houston
v. Rafidain Bank, the judgment provided that there could be no attachment
without further action by the court. Id. at 488.
In contrast, the United Kingdom has begun distributing Iraqi funds to pay
U.K. judgments on a first-come, first-serve basis. Id.
156. Dunning Begins, supra note 72. The U.S. contribution of $92 million
was the only substantial exception. See also Jannuzzo, supra note 124 (noting
that countries holding Iraqi money have declined to loan it to the United Nations,
and quoting Ambassador Carlos Alzamora, Executive Secretary of the UNCC, as
saying: "We trust that the governments holding the funds to which the
compensation fund is entitled will allow the commission to honour on time its
first commitments to claimants all over the world.").
157. Difficult Claims, supranote 154, at 75. The United States loaned the
United Nations $200 million in Iraqi assets, from which the UNCC paid $2.7
million in awards. Id. Most governments had refused to comply or had failed to
respond to the voluntary U.N. resolution calling for the release of Iraqi assets. Id.;
see also Townsend, supra note 42, at 1023, n.357 (noting that 62 countries had
responded to the Secretary-General's request by April 30, 1993, 58 of which
denied having frozen Iraqi assets).
158. Although the UNCC anticipated being able to pay $4 million in claims

in May 1994, it was still short more than $150 million of the $200 million it
hoped to award the following fall. Patrick Crow, Tracking Iraq's Oil Money, OIL &
GAS J., May 23, 1994, at 33.
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Boutros-Ghali suggested that the oil industry could locate the
hundreds of millions of dollars involved.' 5 9 This plan, too, failed
to generate funds, and that failure was accompanied by a
disturbing trend: international resolve to maintain the embargo
seemed to be weakening.
More than half the fifteen countries on the Security Council
had indicated they thought Iraq had taken actions that would
result in the lifting of the embargo.' 6 0 Russia and France argued

that Hussein had made progress and that lifting the embargo
Furthermore, Turkey
would encourage further reform.1 6 1
requested it

be allowed to sell Iraqi oil trapped in

a

Turkish

162
pipeline and to pay the Iraqis with food and medical supplies.

It became increasingly clear that, as the immediate threat to
Kuwait had passed, few countries would champion international
restitution at the expense of their own citizens whose claims
could be paid from frozen assets under those countries' control.
Although the United States remained supportive of the UNCC, it
too began considering how to satisfy domestic claims. At the
request of the Clinton Administration, legislation was introduced
in the Senate and the House to provide a procedure for liquidating

159. Id.
160. Id. Wavering resolve had also been a problem immediately before the
Gulf War. The British, like the Americans, advocated strict adherence to the fall
See Back to the Bulldog Stuff. Britain's Disproportionate
1990 sanctions.
Contribution to the Allied Forces in the Gulf is a Reminder of Much that Sets the
Country Apart from its EuropeanNeighbors, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1991, at 51; Into
the Breach, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 1991, at 52 (recounting the House of Commons
debate on the Iraq-Kuwait situation). France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Greece, and
the Arab alliance seemed less committed to the anti-Iraq coalition. Michael S.
Serrill, Closing Ranks Behind the Yanks: When the Bombs Started Flying, the
British, French,and Italianswere there,TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 67.
161.
Serrill, supra note 160; see also Beyer, supra note 25. France's
questionable commitment to U.N. efforts against Iraq had surfaced in 1990. Less
than two months after the U.N. embargo was imposed, French President Francois
Mitterand suggested offering Hussein a face-saving resolution, stating that if Iraq
were to promise withdrawal from Kuwait, "everything would be possible. .. ."

Beyer, supranote 25. One U.S. official was astounded at Mitterrand's comments,
which contradicted the U.S. position that Iraq must leave Kuwait without
preconditions. Id.
Then, in January 1991, as allied forces prepared to attack Iraq, Mitterrand
proposed to Iraq another compromise, which would protect French interests in
the Arab world. Serrill, supra note 160. Mitterrand's continued pursuit of a
separate peace plan irked the United States and Britain, but ultimately it
mattered little, as Iraq rejected it. Id.
As soon as the war ended, France voiced self-interested concern over "who
would be paid first, Iraq's pre-war creditors or those damaged by the war."
Peaceqfre, supra note 49. It was soon proposed that pre-war creditors should be
paid from oil sales and war damage claimants from Iraq's frozen assets. Id.
162.
Crow, supra note 158.
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Iraq's assets in the United States and allocating those assets
among domestic claimants. 163
This legislation did not conflict with the U.N. claims process
as originally envisioned.
The original U.N. process assumed
funding would come from Iraqi oil sales and did not involve
seizing frozen assets. As noted, however, oil revenues had not

materialized, and the UNCC was in fact dependent on the loans of

frozen assets it had requested governments to make. By pursuing
legislation to reallocate these assets, even if at some future date,
the Clinton Administration signaled its frustration with the claims

process and with the international community's refusal to loan
frozen assets as the United States had.164

163. See, e.g., Iraq Claims Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 3221 & S. 1401
Before the Int'l Econ. Policy, Trade, Oceans, and EnvtL Subcomm. of the Senate
Foreign Relations Comm, Fed. News Serv. Wash. Package, Sept. 21, 1994,
available in 1994 WL 8371276. The Clinton plan, embodied in a House-passed
bill, provided that the U.S. government had first priority in recovering a portion of
its losses; Gulf War veterans had second priority; and U.S. businesses and
individuals had third priority. Under this plan, no claimant would be fully
reimbursed, as only $1 billion in frozen assets existed to pay more than $3 billion
in claims. Id.
164. This relatively mild message, however, did not satisfy U.S. politicians
who wanted domestic claims satisfied even if this undermined the international
claims system. Senatorial discontent was evident from the first subcommittee
hearing on the Clinton legislation. See id.
Senator Paul Sarbanes opened that hearing by announcing, "[Ilt's imperative
that a fair and workable system be devised for adjudicating claims and
compensating claimants." Id. Rather than allowing testimony from the scheduled
speakers, Senator Sarbanes yielded the floor to Senator Jesse Helms, whose
remarks embodied hostile U.S. sentiment directed toward the U.N. efforts:
The committee, represented by Senator Sarbanes and me on this occasion,
is meeting to try to gain an understanding as to why the administration
has moved forward on a policy that by its own admission will not provide
100 percent reimbursements to the U.S. government, to U.S. businesses
and to the U.S. veterans of the Persian civil war.... and, to put it bluntly,
why the administration is unfairly competing against the veterans of
America who served in the Gulf War and against U.S. businesses,
especially when the United States government, unlike the veterans and

the business people.... has the capability to collect 100 percent on Iraqi
debts in a variety of ways from now until eternity....
Saddam Hussein owes us 100 cents on the dollar, not less, and we
should play into his hands by any legislation that would provide
otherwise. I'm going to do the best I can... to prevent the U.S. veterans
and U.S. business people and the U.S. taxpayers from being
shortchanged. And if President Clinton wants to get tough with a
demonstrable reprobate, Saddam Hussein is his man.
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4. Business Pressures Mount
By the end of 1994, waning political support had become a
disturbing and unrelenting influence on the UNCC's progress.
Two other factors added to its distress: first, Saddam Hussein's
indomitability, which had affected the UNCC since its inception,
and second, the workings of the world's business community,
which were a growing concern.
As discussed, Compensation Fund revenues were dependent
on a series of events:
Iraq must comply with its cease-fire
agreements, re-enter the world oil market, and generate cash.
Four years after the war, this process had not begun, and
Hussein gave no indication that it soon would. 165 Not only did
Hussein refuse to disarm, but he was also smuggling oil onto the
16 6
world market, in defiance of the embargo.

165. As one report noted, "A crushing military defeat... and protracted
sanctions have produced no apparent reverses to [Hussein's] survivability."

Dealing with Saddam, MIDDLE E., May 1, 1995, at 5.
166. Kuwait to Sell Intercepted Iraqi Fuel, 41 No. 20 Arab Press Serv.
Diplomat Rec. (1994), available in 1994 W L 2796138. In October 1994, the U.S.
Navy intercepted a Honduran tanker loaded with 3162 tons of Iraqi fuel bound for
the international black market. The United States diverted the tanker to Kuwait,
which, with U.N. approval, sold the fuel and contributed the proceeds to the
Compensation Fund.
Despite this incident and reports that Iraqi oil was flowing again, Iraq insisted
it was not defying the embargo. Iraq's oil minister, Safa Hadi Jawad, dismissed
allegations that Iraq was transporting oil in road tankers to neighboring countries
as "propaganda and fabrication by the Americans and Britons."
Peter
Feuilherade, Opening Up the Oilfields, MIDDLE E., May 1, 1995, at 15.
The White House later reported that 14 sanction-defying vessels carrying
cargoes worth more than $1 million had been diverted to various Gulf ports
between October 1994 and October 1995. Letter from Pres. William J. Clinton to
the Speaker of the House of Reps. & the Pres. pro tempore of the Senate, M2
Presswire, Oct. 25, 1995, available in 1995 WL 10869598; see also Townsend,
supra note 42, at 1011, n.278; UNCC Approves Payment, supra note 130, at 15
(suggesting Iraq had been smuggling oil since 1991).
Smuggling activity continued to thrive during 1997. In March of that year,
President Clinton informed Congress that the three previous months had seen
"the highest volume of smuggler traffic... since maritime sanctions enforcement
began." Letter from Pres. William J. Clinton to the Speaker of the House of Reps.
& the Pres. pro tempore of the Senate, U.S. Newswire, Mar. 7, 1997, available in
1997 WL 5711279. Smugglers exported between 40,000 and 65,000 metric tons
of Iraqi oil through the Gulf each month. Id. By May, this volume had risen to
over 70,000 metric tons per month. Letter from Pres. William J. Clinton to the
Speaker of the House of Reps. & the Pres. pro tempore of the Senate, U.S.
Newswire, May 8, 1997, available in 1997 WL 5712698. By July, it had increased
to 81,000 metric tons per month, despite interception efforts by the United States,
the Netherlands, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Letter from
Pres. William J. Clinton to the Speaker of the House of Reps. & the Pres. pro
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Observing the ineffectiveness of the United Nations and
spirit, the international business
Hussein's intractable
community began operating as though Iraq would soon re-enter
the world market. 16 7 The early months of 1995 saw "a shift in
nations' open policy"
both the rumour mill, and in Western
16 8
regarding contact with Hussein's regime.
In January, France announced it would open an interest
section in Baghdad, posting diplomatic personnel there. 169
Although Britain and the United States expressed disapproval of
this decision, asserting it was tantamount to telling Hussein that
sanctions would soon be removed, the United States was already
operating such a section through the Polish embassy, and British
interests had been served by Russia since 1991.170
Furthermore, observers reported a "steady stream of
briefcase-toting businessmen" maling contact with Iraq.171
British' 7 2 and Italian trade delegations1 7" visited Iraq in early
1991, as did a group of Americans without State Department
approval. 17 4 French and Russian companies signed contracts for

tempore of the Senate, M2 Presswire, July 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL
11938899.
Since July 1997, the volume of smuggled Iraqi oil has doubled, reaching
150,000 metric tons per month in September 1997, Letter from Pres. William J.
Clinton to the Speaker of the House of Reps. & the Pres. pro tempore of the
Senate, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 23, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13913075, and
180,000 metric tons in December, Letter from Pres. William J. Clinton to the
Speaker of the House of Reps. & the President pro tempore of the Senate, M2
Presswire, Dec. 3, 1997, available in 1997 WL 16293997. For a description of
Iraq's oil-smuggling mechanisms and an appraisal of the political situation
surrounding this activity, see Dennis, supra note 138, at 40 (reporting Hussein
makes approximately $10 million per month from oil-smuggling, but that Iran
and the United Arab Emirates may soon stop their involvement in Iraqi

smuggling).
167.
See, e.g., Dealing with Saddarn, supra note 165 (discussing the
"eagerness of Western and Russian partners to resume trade" and observing "if
there is money to be made, a lot of people do not want to rock the boat").
168.
Kirk Albrecht, Passing Through on Business, MIDDLE E., Mar. 1, 1995,
at 28. Albrecht reported that most of the business travelers probably represented
relatively small companies. Larger firms, with contracts underway in the Gulf or
Saudi Arabia, would not jeopardize those deals for speculative Iraqi business. Id.
Small firms that had supplied Iraq before the war, however, had less to lose.
Contractors, pharmaceutical firms, and oil companies may have had the most to
gain in renewing old contacts or forging new ones. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Alan George, What to Do with Saddam?, MIDDLE E., Mar. 1, 1995, at 25.
173. Albrecht, supranote 168.
174. Id.
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oilfield development work. 175 German businessmen complained
about having to refrain from doing business with Iraq while
76
others were making lucrative deals. 1
In March 1991, Baghdad hosted an oil conference at which it
promised lucrative contracts to companies willing to help it
develop new oil fields after sanctions were lifted. 17 7 The oil
company executives who attended came from twenty-nine
countries, including Australia, Britain, Canada, Finland,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and the
United Arab Emirates. 178 Conference attendees did not hide their
enthusiasm about the $30 billion project proposed by Iraq. As a
Finnish oil executive told Reuters, "The potential here must be the
best in the world for increased production and exploration. I am
17 9
here to find out what opportunities there are."
International political leaders became increasingly aware that
the business community was reintegrating Iraq whether or not
diplomats approved. France, Russia, and China pressured the
Security Council to lift sanctions against Iraq.'8 0 Britain still
supported the U.S. position that the resolutions should be
followed to the letter but began urging the United States to
prepare for the day when the Security Council would lift
8
sanctions despite a lack of compliance. 1 '

175.

George, supra note 172; see also Feuilherade, supra note 166

(reporting that French companies Total and Elf Aquitaine had made tentative
deals to develop giant oil fields in Iraq, and that Total's multi-billion dollar deal
would provide it with crude oil for 20 years). These contracts continue to
influence Russian and French attitudes toward Iraq. See Alan Cooperman et al.,
Timeout in the Gulf' Saddam and His Foes 'Live to FightAnother Day,'U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 1, 1997, 42 ("France and Russia want sanctions to be lifted so
Iraq can sell enough oil to repay old debts, more than $8 billion to Moscow and
nearly $6 billion to Paris. Russian and French firms have also negotiated huge oil
deals that will go ahead as soon as the sanctions end."); David Gergen, A Hollow
U.S. 'Victory' After Iraq Crisis and CongressionalFailures,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Dec. 1, 1997, at 98 (arguing the Russians "desperately want to lift the U.N.
sanctions against Baghdad so they can collect on some $10 billion in Iraqi debts
and sign lucrative oil contracts. Their hunger for money and clout runs counter
to our own interests in security.").
176. Albrecht, supranote 168.
177. Feuilherade, supranote 166.
178.
The Clinton Administration asked U.S. oil companies to abstain from
the conference, and all did. A U.S. consultant attended, however, and he
commented, "We are potentially losing out to our competitors. It is too late for the
[U.S.]. This is something that we should worry about." Id.
179.
Id.; see also Dealing with Saddam, supra note 165 ("[B]usiness
contracts are being undertaken in a concerted manner by Britain, France and
Italy. Others are not going to be left far behind.").
180.
George, supra note 172.
181.
Id. Iraq still maintained its ballistic missile and nonconventional
weapons, in defiance of Resolution 687. Additionally, it continued to detain 600
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5. Iraq's Weaponry Proves Decisive

Indeed, the business world seemed to have joined forces with
Hussein so decisively that the sanctions seemed doomed.
Theoretically, this might have been good news for the UNCC: if
Iraq sold oil, the UNCC was to receive thirty percent of the
revenues. In reality, however, the possibility of receiving these
funds was threatened, not bolstered, by this trend.
If Hussein convinced the United Nations to lift the embargo
despite Iraq's noncompliance, he likely would make a subsequent
18 2
demand: that the United Nations not garnish the proceeds.
With the corporate world increasingly hungry for lucrative Iraqi
contracts, ungamished sales were no longer unthinkable.
The first step down this path was lifting the embargo, and
France and Russia were blazing the trail. Those countries
prepared to present a resolution to the Security Council calling for
an immediate suspension of the embargo.18 3 By March 1995, the
resolution's success seemed assured. Then, in April, the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) investigating Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction issued a report that dramatically
altered diplomatic intent.
Iraq and its new-found business allies had eagerly awaited
this report. UNSCOM had overseen the destruction of Iraq's
nonconventional weaponry and established a monitoring system
to prevent their reactivation.1 8 4 Observers believed UNSCOM's
report would state that the commission had done all it could and
that Iraq was in substantial compliance with Resolution 687
despite Iraq's hampering of UNSCOM. 1 85
Instead, UNSCOM reported that, although Iraq's nuclear and
chemical weapons programs had been "curtailed[,] . . . serious
doubts remained about the country's biological warfare
capability." 18 6 Rolf Ekeus, the Swedish diplomat who headed

Kuwaiti prisoners, as well as Kuwaiti property, and to oppress its own civilian
population while refusing to compensate victims. Id.
182. Indeed, this is what happened when the United Nations finally offered
to partially lift sanctions in 1995. Hussein first demanded total lifting of
sanctions, then insisted Iraq should not have to contribute to the Compensation
Fund. See infra text accompanying notes 211-21, 230-35.
183. No Lifting of Sanctions, MIDDLE E., May 1, 1995, at 8 [hereinafter No
Lihng].
184. George, supranote 172.
185. I&
186. No Lifting, supra note 183; see also Alan George, British Contributionto
Saddam's Germ Warfare, MIDDLE E., Nov. 1, 1995, at 16 (describing Iraqi research
on hemorrhagic conjunctivitis, lethal viral diarrhea, camel pox, and other
biological weapons, as well as delivery methods including warplanes with
modified "drop tanks" and gangrene-inducing shrapnel).
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UNSCOM at the time, expressed such dramatic reservations
about Iraq's compliance that France and Russia reversed 7 their
18
position against an immediate suspension of the embargo.
The United States seized the opportunity to revive support for
the embargo, warning the U.N. monitoring program could be shut
down within weeks of any unconditional lifting of sanctions.' 8 8
The State Department estimated that, without sanctions and
monitoring, Iraq's ballistic missile projects would be operational
within one year, its chemical weapons within two, and its atomic
bomb within five.18 9
C. 1995-97: Stalemate
In its seven-year history, the UNCC has processed 2.4 million
claims, for a total of six billion dollars. It has paid claimants,
however, only $726 million, leaving over five billion processed
claims unpaid and $238 billion in claims unprocessed. Iraq's
refusal to re-enter the oil market has created an obstacle to
paying these claims which remains insuperable. The "Ofl-forFood" Deal presented a partial solution to the UNCC's financial
problems, but it ultimately failed to resolve the crisis.
1. Processing Continues, Payment Stalls
By late 1994, the UNCC's inability to fund damage awards,
either through garnishing Iraqi oil revenues or seizing frozen
assets, had become clear. Nevertheless, both claimants and the
UNCC persevered. By November of that year, approximately 2.6
million claims had been filed, with an asserted value of $162
billion. 190 The UNCC doggedly began to process them, and, by

187.
No Lifting, supra note 183; see also Turning the Screw, supranote 139
(quoting the UNSCOM report). Ekeus headed UNSCOM until last summer and is
now Sweden's ambassador to the United States. Bruce W. Nelan et al., The Palace
of Mirrors: Saddam Hussein Tries a Few More Tricks to Get Out of His Sanctions
Box, but the U.S. Can'tEscapeIts Policy Quandary,TIME, Dec. 8, 1997, at 68.
188.
NoLifting, supra note 183.
189. Id.
190.
U.N. Commission Approves Payment of Departure Claims, 9 No. 11
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 12 (1994) [hereinafter Commission Approves Payment].

'The following number of claims had been filed in each category: 900,000 "A"
claims; 5600 "B" claims; 330,000 "C" claims; 9350 "D" claims; 7200 "E" claims;
200 "F"claims. Additionally, Egypt had filed a consolidated claim under Category
C on behalf of 1.24 million Egytians working in Iraq. See also Serious Injury
Claims Relating to Kuwait InvasionApproved, 10 No. 1 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 16

(1995) [hereinafter Injury Claims Approved] (providing a revised count of claims as

of November 1, 1994).
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July 1996, it had approved 2.2 million claims worth $3.7
19
billion. 1
The UNCC's most substantial progress concerned "A," "B,"
and "C" claims. The commissioners and the Governing Council
began processing Category "B" claims first, having deemed them
the most urgent. Between June 1994 and October 1995, the
Council processed all the "B" claims, 192 awarding a total of $13.5
million to 4000 claimants. 193 Between October 1994 and October
1996, the Governing Council processed all the "A" claims. In a
series of six decisions, the Council awarded $3.2 billion to more
In December 1994, the Council
than 922,000 claimants. 19 4

191. U.N. CommissionApprov[els More Gulf War Compensations,Xinhua Eng.
Newswire, July 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11046884 [hereinafter More
Compensations]; UNCC Governing Council Approves 64,000 Individual Loss Claims
Payments, 11 No. 8 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 24 (1996) [hereinafter 64,000
Payments]; see also Bhushan Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for
Compensation,ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1996, atA8.
192. In May 1994, at its 43d meeting, the Council approved the first
installment of "B" claims, 670 awards totalling $2,700,000. See FirstPayments,
supra note 128. The full text of this decision is available as Mealey's Doc. 05940620-010.
In December 1994, the Council approved the second installment, 1751
awards, totalling $5,265,000. Injury Claims Approved, supranote 190, at 16. For
a full"text of this decision, see Decision 26 in section H of Mealey's Doc. 05950130-109; see also Available: U.N.C.C. Reports on Category 'B' and Category 'C'
Claims, 10 No. 2 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 15 (1995) (summarizing payment
decisions and providing information about obtaining full text).
In March 1995, the Council approved 810 awards totalling $2,900,000.
Difficult Claims, supra note 155, at 75; see also Available: U.N.C.C. Reports on
Category 'A' and "B' Claims, 10 No. 5 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 19 (1995) (stating
$2,912,500 was approved on behalf of 811 claimants).
In October 1995, the Council approved 719 awards totalling $2,450,000.
U.N.C.C.: FinalRound of Serious Injury Claims to be Paid, 10 No. 12 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP. 13 (1995) [hereinafter Final Round].
193. Compensation Fund Completes Claims for Gulf War Injuries, Assoc.
Press, Dec. 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 4418996 [hereinafter Compensation
Fund Completes Claims].
194. Future of U.N.C.C., supranote 13. In October 1994, at its 46th meeting
in Geneva, the Governing Council approved payment of the first "A" claims.
Commission Approves Payment, supra note 190. The Council awarded $185.5
million to 54,000 claimants. The full text of the decision and the commissioners'
report on which it was based is reprinted in section D of Mealey's Doc. 05941128-104.
In March 1995, the Governing Council approved payment of the second group
of "A" claims, awarding $626,986,500 to 162,720 claimants. More Departure
Claims Approved by U.N.C.C., 10 No. 4 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 12 (1995)
[hereinafter More ClaimsApproved].
In May 1995, at its 53d meeting, the Council approved payment of the third
group, awarding $517,650,500 to 132,080 claimants. This approval is recorded
in decision 29, reprinted in section I of Mealey's Doc. 05-950828-111. U.N.C.C.
Update: More Departure Claims Approved, 10 No. 8 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 16
(1995).
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began processing "C" claims, and, by December 1996, had issued
decisions on four installments. 195 These decisions encompassed
200,000 of the 420,000 "C" claims, and the UNCC anticipates that
all "C" claims will be processed by 1998.196

In October 1995, the Council approved payment of the fourth group, awarding
$771,531,000 to 217,513 claimants. Approves Payment of Serious Injury Claims,

10 No. 10 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 15 (1995); see also Available: U.N.C.C. Report
on Category 'A' Claims, 10 No. 11 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 18 (1995) (confirming
the previous report on the fourth installment of "A" claims and informing readers
how to acquire the full text of commissioners' report and recommendations).
In December 1995, the Council approved payment of the fifth group, awarding
$784,000,000 to 217,000 claimants. FinalRound, supranote 192, at 13.
In October 1996, the Council approved payment of the sixth group, awarding
$320,000,000 to 80,500 claimants. Future ofU.N.C.C., supranote 13.
195. In December 1994, the Council approved the first installment of "C"
claims, numbering 2863. These awards totalled $51,053,616. Injury Claims
Approved, supra note 190. For a full text of this decision, see Decision 25 in
section H of Mealey's Document 05-950130-109.
In May 1996, the Council approved the second installment of 62,000 claims,
totalling more than $425 million. U.N.C.C. Update: More than 62,000 Individual
Loss Claims Payments Approved, 11 No. 6 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 17 (1996)
[hereinafter 62,000 Claims Approved]; see also Iraqi Victims Get $425 Million,
RocKY MTN. NEWS, June 2, 1996, at 56A; More Gulf War Claims to be Paid,Xinhua
Eng. Newswire, May 30, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10249507; More Claims
Against Iraq, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 30, 1996, at Bl, available in 1996 WL
4187538.
In July 1996, the Council approved the third installment of 64,000 claims,
totalling more than $323 million. More Compensations,supra note 191; 64,000
Payments, supranote 191; see also Thalif Deen, U.N. Preparesto Pay Off Gulf War
Victims, Inter Press Serv., July 25, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 10768382.
In December 1996, the Council approved the fourth installment of 70,000
claims, totalling $637 million. U.N.C.C. Governing Council Approves $610 Million
Award to Kuwait Oil Co., 11 No. 12 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 14 (1996) [hereinafter
Kuwait Oil Co.].
196.
Kuwait Oil Co., supra note 195. Progress with "D," "E," and "FP claims
was less substantial. Not until December 1995 did the Governing Council
approve salaries for the commissioners who would review those claims. Extra
Time Allowed for Large, Complex U.N.C.C. Claims, 11 No. 1 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP.
13 (1996). No commissioners had been appointed as of June 1996, though
administrative processing of claims had begun. 62,000 Claims Approved, supra
note 195; see also Bhushan Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for
Compensation, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1996, at 22, available in 1996 WL-WSJA

10219546

[hereinafter Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for

Compensation] (staing the UNCC has turned to the high-value corporate and
government claims including those of 150 U.S. companies claiming losses of $2
billion and 300 German companies claiming losses of $3 billion); Bhushan
Bahree, Iraq to Seek Some Oil Proceeds Earmarkedfor War Reparations,WALL ST.
J., Aug. 1, 1996, at A8 [hereinafter Bahree, Iraq to Seek Some Oil Proceeds
Earmarkedfor War Reparations] (asserting that companies from Japan, Russia,
the Netherlands, Britain, Jordan, and Egypt all have large claims against Iraq;
noting Kuwait's claim is largest, exceeding $100 billion).
In October 1996, the chief of legal services for the UNCC indicated that no
decisions would be reached before mid-1997, and that none were likely before the
end of 1997. Future of U.N.C.C., supra note 13 (quoting Dr. Norbert Whler).
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Thus, in five years, the UNCC processed over two million
awards totaling almost $4 billion. In contrast to this success in
approving awards, however, lies the UNCC's failure in actually
funding them. The UNCC's initial payment of B-claims, made in
June 1994, was a harbinger of problems to come. Although the
June payment was made promptly after the claims were
approved, 19 7 it was made with borrowed money. 198 Furthermore,

this $2.7 million payment was more symbolic than substantive,
representing less than .001% of the value of claims alleged. 19 9
Most disturbingly, it was the only installment paid during the
UNCC's first four years of operation. 2 ° ° Eventually, the UNCC

paid all 4000 B-claimants, 20 1 and most A- and C-claimants have
received compensation. 2 ° 2 To date, however, most claims remain
unpaid.

Despite this prediction, the Governing Council did approve a $610 million award
for a Category "E" claim filed by the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) for the costs of
extinguishing oil well fires left burning when Iraqi forces withdrew from Kuwait.
KOC claims an additional $337 million, which is still pending. Kuwait Oil Co.,
supra note 195. This claim, however, was not handled by the regular "E" claims
commissioners; the Governing Council had created a special panel in March 1995
to assess KOC's $1 billion claim against Iraq. More Claims Approved, supra note
194, at 12; Difficult Claims, supra note 154, at 74. After a year and a half, this
panel had reached the partial decision noted here.
For discussions of the significance of the UNCC in relation to other
international legal developments of 1996, see Keith Highet, et al., International
Courts and Tribunals, 31 INT'L LAw. 599, 602-05 (1997); John Kim, International
Institutions, 31 INT'L LAW. 671, 673 (1997); John F. Murphy, Foreign Claims, 31
INT'L LAW. 579, 585-87 (1997).
197. See First Payments, supranote 128.
198. See supranotes 155-57 and accompanying text.
199. The settlement value of corporate claims may be substantially less
than the asserted value. One commentator observed that, if international
arbitration settlements are taken as a guide, the ratio may be about 40%.
Bhushan Bahree, U.N. Panel to Process Corporate Claims Totaling About $82 Billion
Against Iraq, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1996, at B8. Commission insiders say the ratio
may be lower because corporations and their insurance companies have, in some
cases, both filed claims. Id. Nevertheless, the $2.7 million award remains at best
a tentative nod toward justice.
200. See supratext accompanying notes 127-29.
201. As discussed above, the first payment of "B" claims, totalling $2.7
million, was made in June 1994. See First Victims, supra note 129. The second
payment, of $8.3 million, was made in October 1995. See supra note 194. The
final payment, of $2.45 million, was made in December 1995. Final Round, supra
note 192, at 13 ("This means the UNCC has paid in full all category B' claims,'
UNCC Press Officer Dr. Walid Abdel Nasser said.").
202. See, e.g., UN United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out
Almost $569 Million, M2 Presswire, Oct. 9, 1997, available in 1997 WL 14466115
[hereinafter Commission Pays Out Almost $569 Million]; UN United Nations
Compensation Commission Pays Out $144 Million, M2 Presswire, Mar. 18, 1997,
availablein 1997 WL 8031379 [hereinafter Commission Pays Out $144 Million].
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Realistically, then, both payment and processing remain
problematic. The UNCC has "awarded" over six billion dollars but
has paid only $726 million. This $726 million amounts to only
.3% of the total asserted value of the claims.
Even if
commissioners are correct that the claims are overvalued by a
factor of three, the payment ratio remains .009.
Furthermore, that the UNCC has processed more than ninety
percent of the claims is little solace to corporate and government
claimants. Although the UNCC efficiently processed 2.4 million of
2.6 million claims, the 200,000 claims remaining account for
$238 billion of the $244 billion in alleged damages. Even if the
commissioners are correct that the outstanding claims are valued
more accurately at $81 billion than $244 billion, the UNCC has
yet to process claims for ninety-three percent of the monetary
damage.
2. The "Oil-for-Food" Deal: Resolution 986
As discussed above, international commitment to the
embargo against Iraq waned during the mid-1990s. A number of
countries became increasingly responsive to pressures from the
business world 20 3 and began advocating an end to the embargo
despite Iraq's failure to comply with treaty terms. 20 4 Added to
these political and corporate forces were the humanitarian
concerns of the United Nations for the Iraqi people.
The United Nations had assessed conditions in Iraq
immediately after the 1991 cease-fire20 s and found hunger,
20 6
illness, and inoperative sanitation and agricultural systems.
As a result, the Security Council passed Resolution 687, allowing
Iraq to receive food and other humanitarian supplies although
20 7
maintaining a general embargo.
This concession was not enough, however, to end the Iraqis'
suffering. Resolution 687 was designed to provide temporary
relief until Iraq began selling oil again. As Iraq has refused to do
so, it has not generated funds needed to restore a tolerable
standard of living.
Seven years after the cease-fire, living
conditions in Iraq remain largely unchanged.
In 1994, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies
described the humanitarian situation in Iraq as "disastrous,"20 8
and this situation has continued to deteriorate. Malnutrition and

203.

See supranotes 167-81 and accompanying text.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See supranotes 160-62, 180-81 and accompanying text.
See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 56-59 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 60-63 and accompanying text.
Turning the Screw, supranote 139.
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child mortality have increased dramatically during the embargo,
and damaged sanitation facilities, poor disease control, and a lack
of safe water have led to a steep escalation in water-borne
Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein has built fifteen
diseases. 20 9
2 10
palaces rather than repairing the infrastructure.
In response to this crisis, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 986 in April 1995.211 Resolution 986 provided that
Iraq could export $1 billion of oil every ninety days,
notwithstanding Resolution 661 (1990), which otherwise prohibits
The resolution placed two conditions on the
exportation. 2 12
exports: (1) that the Iraqi Sanctions Committee 2 13 approve each
sale; 2 14 and (2) that payments be made into a special escrow
account overseen by the U.N. Secretary-General. The resolution
provided it would become effective one day after the SecretaryGeneral informed the Security Council that requisite preparations
were complete and would remain in force for an initial 180-day
period. Moreover, the resolution required the Security Council to
review the exportations twice during this period, and to consider
renewing the resolution if the reviews were favorable and if Iraq
had equitably distributed the food and medical supplies
purchased with the proceeds.21 s The resolution also required
percent of the
that the Compensation Fund receive up to2 1thirty
6
funds deposited in the Iraqi escrow account.
Initially, Resolution 986 seemed like a promising step toward
solving a variety of problems: it would provide enough funds for
humanitarian relief but not enough for military build-up; it
invited Iraq to rejoin the world economy while preserving the

209. Id. Child mortality increased by as much as two to three times the
pre-sanction levels during the first five years of the embargo. Rampant diseases
included typhoid, cholera, hepatitis, and malaria. Shortages in medical supplies
and equipment prevented doctors from providing treatment and performing
surgery. Id210. Bums, supra note 138. Richard Haas of the Brookings Institute
believes these "palaces"have a military function. Haas, supranote 138.
211. S.C. Res. 986, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3519th mtg., 8(c), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/986 (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 1144 (1996). Argentina, the United
States, and the United Kingdom proposed this resolution, Tovmsend, supra note
42, at 981, and the Security Council unanimously adopted it, S.C. Res. 986,
supra.
212. S.C. Res. 986, supra note 211.
213. This committee was created by Security Council Resolution 661. See

supranote 16 and accompanying text.
214. See S.C. Res. 986, supra note 211. Resolution 986 instructs the
Sanctions Committee to ensure that the purchase price reflects fair market value,
that an export route is available, and that the purchase conforms with other
provisions of the resolution.
215. Id.
216. Id. This requirement is pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
Resolution 705. S.C. Res. 705, supranote 84.
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requirement that Iraq honor its treaty obligations;
and it would
21 7
provide a source of funds for the UNCC.
Iraq, however, rejected Resolution 986 immediately, 2 18 calling
it "illogical and interventionist." 2 19 Insisting on the total lifting of
sanctions, 22 0 Iraq argued that Resolution 986 interfered with Iraqi
sovereignty because it allotted some food to rebel Kurds, to be
221
distributed outside Iraqi government channels.

Iraq maintained this stance for ten months. Then, in 1996,
Iraq and the United Nations entered negotiations leading to Iraq's
acceptance of the terms of Resolution 986. In February of that
year, U.N. legal counsel Hans Corell and Iraqi envoy Abdul Amir
al-Anbari held a series of fourteen 'technical discussions" in
which details of the "oil-for-food" deal were addressed. 22 2 They
failed to reach an agreement, however,2 23 and a second round of
217. For a discussion of the negotiations and the oil markets' reactions, see
U.N. GrantsIraqPermissionto Sell Oilfor Food,Medicine, Other Supplies: Baghdad
Weighing the Limited Lifting of Sanctions, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Apr. 15,
1995, availablein 1995 WL 5216170 [hereinafter U.N. GrantsPermission].
218. Dilip Ganguly, Iraq Refuses to Sell Oil for Food; Instead, Leaders
Denounce U.S., NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Apr. 16, 1995, at A2, available in
1995 WL 6068354. Ganguly describes the reaction in Baghdad on the day
Resolution 986 was passed. Thousands of demonstrators, mostly government

employees, marched through the streets holding placards with photos of Saddam
Hussein and banners denouncing the United States and the United Nations. Id.
Abdul Gani Abdul Ghafoor, chief of the Baghdad chapter of the leading Baath
party, said, "We need to fight the holy war against Satan America until our
victory." Id. Although Iraqis interviewed by foreign reporters anonymously
expressed strong support for 986, state-run Youth Radio, supervised by
Hussein's eldest son, broadcast interviews with what it described as "ordinary
Iraqis," who criticized Resolution 986 and urged the government to reject it. Id.
Iraq is no stranger to such deceptive broadcasts. After the Gulf War ceasefire, Baghdad Radio announced: "0 Iraqis Yes, you triumphed when you stood
with all this vigor against the armies of 30 statesl You triumphed while
emphasizing your ability to face the showdown and confrontationl You have
recorded for Arabs and Muslims bright pages of glory that will be remembered for
generations" Scott MacLeod, With His Country in Ruins, How Long Can Saddam
Hang On?, TIME, Mar. 11, 1991, at 35.
219. Feuilherade, supra note 166. The Iraqi News Agency quoted Deputy
Prime Minister Tariq Aziz as saying, "This new American project is nothing but a
manoeuvre [sic] to deceive international opinion and prolong the embargo." Id.
220. See, e.g., U.N. GrantsPermission,supra note 217; Ganguly, supra note
218; U.N. Investigator,supranote 138.
221. John M. Goshko, U.N., Iraq End Discussions on Oil Sales, WASH. POST,
Feb. 20, 1996, at A3. The Iraqis considered this requirement tantamount to
legitimizing the secession of northern Iraq. Id.

222.

Id.; see also Michael Littlejohns, Progress in Iraq-U.N. Oil Sale Talks,

FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 20, 1996, at 5.
223.

Robert H. Reid, Iraqi Oil Talks End Without a Pact, HOUSTON CHRON.,

Feb. 20, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 5582742. Sources said the Iraqis
insisted that $4 billion of frozen assets be returned to them but the United
Nations would not accede to this demand. See also Iraq, United Nations Talks on
'Oil for Food' Resolution Adjourned, 11 No. 2 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 14 (1996)
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talks was held in March. 22 4 Those talks also ended without an
agreement, primarily because the dispute over aid to the Kurds
2 26
5
remained unresolved. 22 Finally, after a third round of talks,
Iraq and the United Nations reached an agreement about the
resumption of oil sales. This agreement was memorialized in a
Memorandum of Understanding on May 20, 1996.227
As Resolution 986 had originally provided, Iraq could now sell
up to $2 billion worth of oil over six months. Iraq's chief
negotiator, Abd al-Amir al-Anbari, was confident that oil sales
The UNCC anticipated
would resume by August 1996.228
receiving $100 million per month with which it could begin paying
claims. 2 29 These predictions, however, proved overly optimistic.
In August, Hussein's government began to balk at the deal,
23 0
demanding that Iraq receive the money allocated to the UNCC.

Iraq argued it needed the money to pay for its legal defense
against the compensation claims and further asserted a right to
Iraq's Deputy Foreign
the funds under international law.2 3 1

(quoting a U.N. spokesman as saying that disagreement remained as to what
percentage of oil sales would go through Turkey, as opposed to Iraqi Gulf ports).
224. Aid for Kurds Sticking Point in Iraq Talks, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Cal.),
Mar. 19, 1996, at A3, availablein 1996 WL 7017688.
225. Id.
226. Iraq Optimistic as UN Sanctions Talks Start, LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Apr. 9,
1996, at 10, available in 1996 WL 6273527. These talks began April 8, 1996.
They were suspended temporarily when the United States objected to some terms,
Bahree, Iran Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for Compensation, supranote 196, but
ultimately resulted in a pact. See also Letter from Pres. William J. Clinton to the
Speaker of the House of Reps. & the Pres. pro tempore of the Senate, M2
Presswire, May 7, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10341847 ("It remains unclear
whether Iraq is serious about implementing [Resolution 986] as drafted. We
would like to see [it] implemented, but only with the safeguards envisioned in the
Resolution to ensure that Saddam Hussein cannot abuse [its] humanitarian
purposes.").
227.
'Oilfor Food' Resolution to be Implemented, 11 No. 5 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP. 14 (1996); see also 35 I.L.M. 1095 (1996) (providing the full text of the
Memorandum of Understanding, signed May 20, 1996); Iraq Accepts U.N.
HumanitarianOil Deal, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 20, 1996, available in 1996
WL 5/20/96 Deutsche Presse-Agentur 12:42:00 (stating the parties resolved the
food distribution dispute by providing that U.N. humanitarian agencies would
distribute food in the Kurdish north but that Saddam Hussein would devise the
distribution plan for the rest of Iraq, subject to U.N. approval and monitoring);
Burns, supra note 138 (transcript of State Department briefing concerning the
implementation of Resolution 986).

228.

Peter Feuilherade, Iraq Agrees Oil for Food Deal with UN,

MIDDLE

E.,

July 17, 1996, at 9.
229. Deen, supranote 195.
See Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for Compensation,
230.
supra note 196; Bahree, Iraq to Seek Some Oil Proceeds Earmarked for War
Reparations,supranote 196.
231. Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for Compensation, supra
note 196. Iraq has continued to demand money from the UNCC to cover its legal
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Minister, Riyadh Al-Qaysi, presented this argument to the panel
of commissioners evaluating the KOC claim, 23 2 which refused to
delay hearings on that claim. Al-Qaysi then walked out with his
delegation, announcing to the press that "it would be a parody of
justice" if the Governing Council garnished Iraq's oil revenues to
pay the Compensation Commission.2 33 Shortly thereafter, Iraq

invaded Kurdistan, further delaying oil sales under Resolution
986.234 As the Commission's executive secretary put it, "Troubles
2 35
have upset the plan."

At

last,

in

December

1996,

Resolution

986

was

implemented-twenty months after the Security Council had
236
adopted it and seven months after Iraq had agreed to it.
Despite its inauspicious beginnings, the oil-for-food plan
functioned admirably for the first half of 1997.

By February of

that year, the Sanctions Committee had approved four contracts

for humanitarian aid, totaling $97.5 million; supplies were to
reach Iraq by March. 23 7 During the first 180-day period of the
oil-for-food regime, fifty-one oil contracts were approved for a total
of 121 million barrels, and sales of $2.16 billion were
completed.2 3 8 By the time the period ended in June, over $1.7
billion in oil-sale proceeds had been deposited into Iraq's U.N.
account, and $497.2 million had been transferred directly to the

fees, Iraq Still Wants Money to Cover Legal Fees, 12 No. 7 MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP.
22 (1997), alleging that the UNCC is entertaining "excessive and absurd" claims
that have no legal basis, Thalif Deen, U.N.-Mideast: Iraq Alleges Frivolous Claims
for War Reparations, Inter Press Serv., Aug. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL
13256041. Despite vigorous U.S. opposition, the United Kingdom recently agreed
to consider releasing some of Iraq's frozen assets so Iraq could hire legal counsel
to defend against these claims. Richard Norton-Taylor, Iraq Asks UK to Release
Assets, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 25, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 14737328.
232.
See supranote 196 (discussing the specini panel appointed to consider
the KOC claim).
233. Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for Compensation, supra
note 196; see also Iraq Wants to Tap CompensationFundfor Legal Fees, 11 No. 10
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 23 (1996).
234.
3.2 Billion Dollarsfor Workers Driven from Kuwait by Iraqis,Agence Fr.Presse, Oct. 16, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12158585 [hereinafter 3.2 Billion
Dollars]; OPEC Will Not Change Production Ceilingin 1997, Agence Fr.-Presse, Nov.
18, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 12183412.
235. 3.2 Billion Dollars, supra note 234; see also Future of U.N.C.C., supra
note 13.
236.
U.N. Begins Dispersing Funds to Buy Supplies for Iraq, Dow Jones Intl
News Serv., Jan. 30, 1997, availablein WL 1/30/97 DJINS 15:09:00.
237.
U.N. May Approve 10 More Iraq Aid Contracts by Friday, Dow Jones
News Serv., Feb. 13, 1997, available in 1997 WL 2/13/97 DJNS 10:14:00

[hereinafter 10 More Aid Contracts].
238.
UN: Security Council Extends Iraq 'Oil-for Food' Arrangement for
Additional 180 Days, Beginning 8 June, M2 Presswire, June 5, 1997, available in
1997 WL 10371786.
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UNCC fund, with $151.3 million allocated to the payment of
claims and UNCC operating expenses.2 3 9 From these funds, the
UNCC paid $144 million to sixty-three governments and one
international organization in satisfaction of 57,636 "A" and "C"
2
claims. 4o
After
This payment trend, however, did not continue.
completing a single 180-day oil-for-food period, Iraq raised new
objections to the agreement and suspended oil sales.2 4 1 The
UNCC thus conducted its twenty-fourth meeting under the
familiar and unfortunate conditions that had plagued its five-year
history: it awarded to claimants substantial sums it had no
immediate prospects of being able to fund. Specifically, at its
June meeting, the UNCC approved a fifth installment of 76,000

"C" claim payments totalling $721 million, 24 2 to be distributed to

forty-three countries and three international organizations.

243

claim awards to $2.1
That installment brought the total of 2"C"
44
billion, to be paid to 277,730 claimants.

At its next meeting in September, the UNCC reviewed claims
from 1.24 million Egyptian workers 2 45 seeking redress for lost

239. Id. Other developments during this period included the UNCC's
decision to expedite "A" claims from 1306 Indian claimants, 1,306 to Get Gulf War
Compensation, HINDU, Apr. 10, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9969231, and its
decision to postpone its next meeting from April 28, 1997, to June 23 and 24, UN:
Compensation Commission Governing Council to Meet in June, M2 Presswire, May
1, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 10367330.
240. Thalif Deen, United Nations: U.N. Doles Out $144 Million in Reparations,
Inter Press Serv., Mar. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7074159; Pay Out of First
Awards Causing Chaos in Kuwait, 12 No. 4 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 16 (1997);
Commission Pays Out $144 Million, supranote 203.
Future Award Payments from UNCC Compensation Fund are in Doubt,
241.
12 No. 7 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 20 (1997). The suspension lasted from June to
mid-August. UN: Gulf War CompensationBody Meets to Discuss Payouts, Agence
Fr.-Presse, Sept. 29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13404163 [hereinafter
The Iraqis cited delays in distribution of
Compensation Body Meets].
humanitarian goods as their reason for suspending sales; this complaint was the
latest in a series of such complaints against their Gulf War adversaries. As Iraq's
U.N. ambassador had previously stated, "[These problems are] the fault of the
system which includes the U.N. and the 661 Committee.... They are giving us a
very unsmooth implementation." 10 More Aid Contracts,supranote 238.
CompensationBody Meets, supranote 241.
242.
UN: Compensation Commission's Council Approves $721 Million for
243.
Individual Losses Up to $100,000, M2 Presswire, June 25, 1997, availablein 1997
WL 11936270 [hereinafter Council Approves $721 Million]; Capdevila, supra note
13.

244.

Council Approves $721 Million, supra note 243; Capdevila, supra note

13. The UNCC also approved the appointment of six Commissioners to handle
"E" claims. Council Approves $721 Million, supra note 243; Capdevila, supra note
13.
UN to Compensate Egyptian Workers, supranote 14.
245.
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funds they had deposited in Iraqi banks for transfer to Egypt. 2 46
Although the UNCC concluded that 223,817 claims did not fall
within its jurisdiction, it awarded 900,000 workers $84,393,992,
bringing the total number of claims resolved to more than 2.4
24 7
million, for a total of more than $6 billion.
Fortunately for claimants and the UNCC,

oil-for-food

revenues were once again being generated after the June-toAugust hiatus imposed by Iraq. Thus, in October 1997, the
UNCC was able for the third time2 48 to make funds available to

pay previously awarded "A" and "C" claims. 2 49

These funds

totalled $568,972,563, and were transferred to seventy-five
governments and three international organizations on behalf of
25 0
228,575 claimants.
At its final meeting of 1997, the UNCC approved the award of
$2,220,043 in satisfaction of eleven "F" claims filed by nine
2s
governments.
D. The Future of the UNCC: The "AmbitiousFive-Year Plan"
After seven years of operation, the UNCC still has $238
billion of claims to resolve. The most substantial claims have yet
to be evaluated.
Thousands of corporations seek billions of

246.

CompensationBody Meets, supranote 241.

247.
UIN to Compensate Egyptian Workers, supranote 14. For an extended
discussion of the Egyptian Workers' Claim, see Lack of DocumentationDrastically
Cuts Payment on $491 Million Egyptian Workers' Claims, 12 No. 10 MEALEY'S INT'L
ARB. REP. 12 (1997). As that article states, the original claim filed on behalf of the
Egyptian workers sought $491 million on behalf of 1.24 million claimants. Id.
The UNCC panel that evaluated the claim concluded that documentation for
many claims was inadequate and recommended that only $84 million be paid to
223,817 claimants. Id.
248. *Asdiscussed above, the UNCC made $13,450,000 available to satisfy
all "B" claims by the end of 1995. In March 1997, the UNCC made available
$144,019,945 to resolve the first installment of "A" and "C" claims. See, e.g.,

Commission Pays Out Almost $569 Million, supranote 202.
249.

Id

These claims had been resolved in the second installment of

awards. Id.
250. Id.; see also UNCC Pays $568,972,563 in Departure and PersonalLoss
Claims, 12 No. 10 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 14 (1997). Kuwait received $105
million from this disbursement.
Kuwait Receives 105 Million in Gulf War
Compensation, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Oct. 11, 1997, available in 1997 WL
10/11/97 DCHPA 13:39:00. Pakistan received $12 million. Pakistan Gulf War
Victims Getfl Over 12 Million Dollarsfrom UN, Agence Fr.-Presse, Nov. 12, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 13432768. The Philippines received $4.6 million. Gulf War
Claims, Bus. WORLD (Manila), Nov. 26, 1997, available in 1997 WL 16252142.
251.
UN: Governing Council of United Nations Compensation Commission
Concludes Session, M2 Presswire, Dec. 23, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 16296826.
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dollars in "E" claim compensation, 25 2 and numerous countries
for
seek additional billions in "F" claim compensation 253
environmental damage and costs incurred in responding to it.
The UNCC has set forth an ambitious plan for processing all these
claims by 2003.254 It intends to complete all Category "C" claims
by the end of 1998 and will then concentrate its resources on the
remaining "D," "E," and "F" claims. 25 5 Based on its record thus
far, the UNCC seems likely to be able to evaluate these claims
according to the schedule it has established. The diligence and
speed with which the commissioners and their staff have worked

has often been lauded.25 6 The unanswerable question, however,
is the obvious one: will Iraq maintain oil sales that will generate
the revenue required to satisfy the claims processed by the

UNCC?
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

During the seven years of its existence, the UNCC has
accomplished a great deal. It has approved 2.4 million awards
worth more than $6 billion,25 7 and it has paid "A," "B," and "C"
claimants more than $726 million.2 s s More significantly, it has
renewed faith in the post-war claims commission as an
institution.

252. See Highet et al., supranote 13, at 603 (noting there are $80 billion in
"E" claims); King, supra note 13, at 603 (describing the author's visit to UNCC
headquarters and discussing specific claims such as those arising from the
Bekhme Dam case, and listing the top 10 corporate claimants by country).
253. See $27 Billion in Environmental Claims Filed with UNCC, 12 No. 2
MEALEY'S INTL ARB. REP. 17 (1997) (discussing Kuwait's $16.3 billion claim, Iran's
$11 billion claim, the U.S. $8.8 million claim, and smaller claims by Australia,
Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey); Highet et al.,
supra note 13, at 603 (noting there is between $100 and $200 billion in "F"
claims).
254. UNCC Adopts 'Ambitious' Work Program, 12 No. 10 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB.
REP. 15 (1997).
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for Compensation,

supranote 196; Richard B. Bilder &Alan D. Meltzer, Book Review, 90 AM. J. INT'L
L. 532 (1996) (reviewing THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Richard
B. Lillich ed., Traisnational Publishers, Inc. 1995)); Bederman, 1994, supranote
13, at 42.
257. Capdevila, supra note 13.
$13,450,000 in 1995,
258. This total results from three payments:
CompensationFund Completes Claims, supranote 193; $144,019,945, UN. United
Nations Compensation CommissionPays Out $144 Million, M2 Presswire, March 18,
United Nations
1997, available in 1997 WL 8031379; $568,972,563, UN:
Compensation Commission Pays Out Almost $569 Million, M2 Presswire, Oct. 9,
1997, availablein 1997 WL 14466115.
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The UNCC has garnered praise from many quarters.
Observers have called its progress "remarkably swift and
2 60
It
unprecedented" 25 9 and its accomplishments "impressive."
has been lauded as a "bold and thus far largely successful
experiment,"2 6 1 "an institution that represents one of the most
2 62
important developments in international law in this decade,"
"the fulfillment of the ideal of peaceful settlement of
disputes .... "263
Yet its success has not been unbridled. For the first five years
of its existence, the UNCC's operating budget exceeded claims
payments by a factor of two. 2 6 Total operating costs during that
period probably exceeded payments by a factor of ten. If its
success were to be measured by its ability to compensate victims
swiftly, the UNCC would have to be deemed a failure.
But the UNCC is a success, because it serves all the
traditional goals of post-war reparation. 26 5
Society remains
interested in achieving correction, example, and retribution
regarding proponents of unjust wars. The UNCC is an important
mechanism for achieving these goals, even though it has had
limited success in delivering funds.
Regarding the goal of correction, 2 6 6 the UNCC's success is
reflected in Saddam Hussein's failure to create a global holocaust
2 67
and to accomplish his goal of recreating the Abbasid Empire.
In practical terms, the UNCC's garnishment mechanism deters
future military activity because the reduced revenues render Iraq
less able to engage in military spending.2 68 Garnishment also
deters military aggression by making the Iraqis less willing to

259.
Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds Marked for Compensation, supra
note 196.
260.
Bilder & Meltzer, supranote 256, at 532; see also Susan Taylor Martin,
U.N. Can Boast of Record in Helping Gulf War Victims, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan.
11, 1998 (praising "the impressive work" of the UNCC).
261.
Id.
262. Id. at 534.
263. Bederman, 1994, supranote 12, at 42.
264.
See Townsend, supranote 42, at 1013, n.289; supranote 151.
265.
See supranotes 5-11 and accompanying text.
266.
See supranotes 7-8 and accompanying text.
267.
See, e.g., Lance Morrow, The Devil in the Hero: Iraq'sLeader May Be a
Blood-Drenched Tyrant, But For Many He Is Nonetheless a Symbol of Dignity, Unity
and Self-Reliance, TIME, Jan. 28, 1991, at 64 (asserting Saddam Hussein casts
himself alternatively as Nebuchadnezzar and an Arabian Bismarck).
See
generally Dennis, supra note 138, at 41 (suggesting Saddam Hussein considers
himself a modem Nebuchadnezzar).

268. During the 1980s, Iraq spent between a third and half of its revenues
on the military. Garnishing 30% of future oil revenues should prevent recurrence
of such spending, because the remaining 70% is needed to restore Iraq's ruined

infrastructure and meet humanitarian needs.
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undertake such action. It provides a warning that unjust
belligerence will not go unpunished. Although critics of the
garnishment provision have argued that it exacts too high a price
from the Iraqi people, such arguments fail in the face of wellestablished precepts concerning human rights and duties.2 6 9 The
Iraqis should not be allowed to evade their moral and financial
2 70
obligations by hiding behind the Myth of Popular Innocence.
By requiring Iraq to fulfill the obligations to which it has agreed,
the United Nations effectuates the corrective purpose of the ceasefire provisions.
Regarding the goal of example, 2 7 1 the UNCC's success is
shown best by the fact that victims of other wars have begun to
inquire as to whether the United Nations can establish similar
commissions to evaluate their claims. 27 2 Although aggressors
may go undeterred, thus failing to heed the U.N. message of
nonaggression, at least their victims find in the UNCC an example

of a global attempt to vindicate victims' rights.

Finally, regarding the goal of retribution, 2 73 the UNCC has
exacted satisfaction from Iraq on behalf of thousands of claimants
who, though not fully restored, have received substantial
compensation.

269. See, e.g., GROTIUS, Kelsey trans., supra note 1, at 535 (punishment
may be inflicted on a community so long as the community exists); i&. at 587
(subjects ordered to go to unjust war should refuse to serve); id. at 624 ("it has
been established by the law of nations that both the possessions and the acts of
subjects are liable for the debt of a ruler").
See The Gulf War: Commentary, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 4,
270.
1991, at 41.
271.
See supranotes 9-10 and accompanying text.
272.
Delegations from Rwanda and Bosnia visited UNCC headquarters in
Geneva last year in an effort to determine whether a similar commission could be
set up on behalf of war victims in Central Africa and the former Yugoslavia. King,
supranote 13.
The difficulty of making an "example" of Middle Eastern aggressors is revealed
in the words of Ahmad Oweidi Abbadi, chairman of the Jordanian National Front
and a member of parliament:
We Arabs are proud of our dignity. Saddam talks about things we feel.
The U.S. will win the battle but lose the war. Both Arab Christians and
Muslims want a jihad against America, against the U.K. and the Jews.
The citizens of every nation fighting against Iraq will be in danger-those
with blue eyes and a red face.... As the U.S destroys Iraq, it will give
birth to the jihad that will destroy the West.
Morrow, supranote 267.
The diplomatic community must remain cognizant of the dangers posed, and
it must inform the business community of the risks of dealing with Saddam
Hussein. In the words of one Egyptian observer: "He is a very bad man." Morrow,
supra. See also supranote 138.
273.
See supranote 11 and accompanying text.
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As a U.N.-sponsored commission, the UNCC serves both
symbolic and practical functions. In the long run, it will fail to
compensate all victims for all harms suffered. Nevertheless, it
that
embodies principles society cannot afford to sacrifice:
unjustified aggressors will be punished and that, at least on
occasion, their victims will be compensated.
Lea Carol Owen*

* J.D. Candidate, Vanderbilt Law School, 1998; B.A., Yale University. The
Author wishes to thank Ms. Stacy Feld and the editors of the Vanderbilt Journalof
TransnationalLaw for their assistance in preparing this manuscript; Professors
Frederick M. Ahl, Joan Dayan, Neil R. McMillen, and C. Warren Robertson for

their advice and encouragement; and the Trustees of Telluride Association for
their continuing support of her education. The Author especially thanks her
daughter, Kelsey Owen Lewis, and her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Charles W. Owen,

for their devotion and patience.

-/€.j1t-

